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SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The present study display in the form of annotated bibliography 
resembles together all the significant literature dealing with the India's foreign 
relation with developing countries of Asia. Although the bibliography is 
selective in nature but exhaustive. An attempt has been made to cover all 
aspect of relations. I am confident that this bibliography will be useful to all 
those who are interested in the field of political science. 
The bibliography is divided in three parts. Part I deals with the description of 
the work. Part II is the main part of the present study consisting of an 
annotated, list of 201 articles on the subject. These entries are not 
comprehensive but are fairly informative on the subject. 
Part III, however deals with the indexes, 
METHODOLOGY: 
The primary source were consulted in the following libraries: 
(1.) Department of political science AMU, Aligarh. 
(2.) Maulana Azad library, AMU. Aligarh. 
(3.) Department of Library and Information Science. AMU, Aligarh. 
(4.) Coaching Guidance Centre, AMU. Aligarh." 
(5.) NASSDOC, New Delhi. 
V 
PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN PREPARING THE BIBLIOGRAPHY: 
(1.) The secondary sources were consulted in Maulana Azad Library, AMU, 
Aligarh to find the location of articles as well as seminar library of 
Political Science, AMU, Aligarh. 
(2.) The relevant bibliographical details were noted down in 5"x7" card 
following the ISI standard. 
(3.) On completion of the abstract subject headings were assigned. The 
subject heading are completely co-extensive to the extent possible. 
(4.) The subject were arranged in an alphabetical sequence. 
(5.) At the end three separate alphabetical index were given. 
(i) Author index 
(ii) Title index 
(iii) Subject index with reference to various 
entries by their respective number. 
STANDARD FOLLOWED: 
I followed the rules and practices of the Indian standard for 
bibliographical reference (IS: 2381-1963) for each entry of the bibliography. 
Thus it gives an uniformity for the bibliographical reference through out this 
select bibliography. The classified catalogue code (CCC) of Dr. S.R. 
Ranganathan has followed for choice and rendering of authors and headings. 
VI 
SUBJECT HEADING: 
An attempt has been made to give co-extensive subject heading 
as much as possible. It will facilitate the reader to find out desired articles 
from this bibliography. 
An humble effort has been made to follow postulates and 
principles as suggested by Dr. S.R. Ranganathan in the formation of subject 
heading. These are arranged strictly by the principle of alphabetical sequence. 
ARRANGEMENT: 
The entries are arranged under subject headings which are 
arranged alphabetically letter by letter. 
The entry is preceded by subject heading in capitals. The entr> 
begins with entry element (i.e. surname) of the author is capitals, followed by 
secondary element (i.e. forename) within paranthesis and then the title of the 
article, after this the title of the periodical being underlined in abbreviated or 
full form, its volume number, issue number, year, month of publications and 
date after which are given the page number of the articles. 
The item of bibliographical reference for each entry contains the 
following information: 
(a) Name (s) of author (s) 
(b) Full Stop (.) 
(c) Title of contribution including subtitle, if any 
(d) Full stop (.) 
VII 
(e) Title of the periodical 
(f) Full stop (.) 
(g) Volume number 
(h) Issue number (with in bracket) 
(i) Semi-colon (;) 
(j) Month 
(k) Coma(,) 
(1) Year of publication 
(m) Semi-colon (;) 
(n) Inclusive pages of article 
(o) Full stop (.) 
SPECIMEN ENTRY 
DUTTA (Sujit). India-China relation in the post-cold war era. Strategic 
Analysis. 16 (11); February, 1994, 1411-1430 p. 
India and China have begun a significant transformation and revitalization of 
their relationship, which will have a far reaching impact on the rest of the 
continent. The two governments have indicated their desire to enhance the 
cooperative aspects of the relationship, settle their existing disputes 
peacefully, implement a series of confidence and security building measures 
so as to avoid accidental conflict or tensions. 
Vll l 
ABSTRACT: 
The entries in the bibliography contain abstracts giving essential 
information about the articles. Attempts have been made to prepare indicative 
abstract, so that in most of the cases users need are fulfilled with the abstract 
itself. 
INDEX: 
The index contains list of the subject heading, author index and 
title index. Each entry is arranged letter b> letter method and is followed by 
entry number. It is hoped that it will be found very much useful in consultation 
of the bibliography. 
IX 
LIST OF PERIODICALS SCANNED: 
SjNo. Name of Journals 
1. Asia Pacific Community 
2. Asian Quarterly 
3. Asian Affairs: An American Review 
4. Asian Profile 
5. Asian Studies 
6. Asian Survey 
7. Australian Journal of Political History 
8. China Quarterly 
9. China Report 
10. Civil Service Chronicle 
11. Commerce 
12. Comparative Strategy 
13. Contemporary Southeast Asia 
14. Contemporary Southeast Asia 
15. Defence Seminar 
16. Diplomacy and State craft 
17. Economic and Political Weekly 
18. Etudes International 
19. Financial Express 
20. Foreign Affairs Report 
21. Front Line 
22. Hindustan Times 
23. India Quarterly 
24. India Today 
25. Indian Journal of Political Science 
26. International Affairs 
27. International Comparative Law Quarter!} 
28. International Peace Keeping 
29. International Political Science Review 
30. International Quarterly 
31. International Relations 
32. International Studies 
33. Iranian Journal of International Affairs 
34. Issues and studies 
35. Janata 
36. Journal of Contemporary Asia 
37. Journal of Political Science 
38. Journal of Social Psychology 
39. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern 
Studies 
40. Journal of Strategic Studies 
41. Mainstream 
XI 
42. Nation and the world 
43. Out Look 
44. Pacific Affairs 
4 5. Pacific Community 
46. Pacific Review 
47. Pakistan Horizon 
48. Problems of Communism 
49. Punjab Journal of Politics 
50. Regional Studies 
51. Security dialogues 
52. South Asian Journal 
53. South Asian Survey 
54. Strategic Analysis 
55. Sunday 
56. The Week 
57. The World Today 
58. USI Journal 
59. World Affairs 
60. World Focus 
61. World Policy Journal 

INTRODUCTION 
Though India formally emerged as independent country in 
August, 1947 the basic principles of its foreign policy had been evolved during 
the period of colonial rule itself The most significant pronouncement 
regarding India's foreign policy in the pre-independence days was the 
congress resolution. Another significant pronouncement about the Indian 
foreign policy was made by Jawaharlal Nehru on September 2, 1946 after the 
assumption of reigns of the provisional government. It is for this one world 
that free India will work a world in which there is the free cooperation of free 
peoples and no class or group exploits another, the peoples of Asia are nearer 
and closer to us than others. India is so situated that she is the pivot of 
Western, Southern and South East Asia. In the past her culture followed to all 
these countries and they came to her in many ways. Those contacts are being 
renewed and the fiiture is bound to see a close union between India and 
South-East Asia on the one side and Afghanistan, Iran and Arab world on the 
other. India has followed with anxious interest the struggle of the Indonesians 
for freedom and to them we send our good wishes... China, that mighty 
country with a mighty past, our neighbour has been our friend through the age 
and that friendship will endure and grow. For this reason our coming too 
closer to the great country, the Soviet Union, is very important, but this does 
not mean that we have drifted away from any other country. 
The preservation of peace forms the central aim of India's 
foreign policy. It is in the pursuit of policy that we have choosen the path of 
non-alignment. The principles of India's foreign policy were further elaborated 
and extended by Nehru and found their outlet in the shape of various speeches 
and pronouncements, it may be noted that India's foreign policy has not been 
static and has undergone changes according to agencies of time and 
requirements of domestic as well as international situations. 
PRINCIPLES OF INDIANS FOREIGN POLIICY 
The main principles of India's foreign policy are mentioned below: 
(1) NON-ALIGNMENT: Non-alignment is one of the most 
significant principles of India's foreign policy. When India gained 
independence, the world was divided into two camps headed by t^ '^o 
superpowers namely Soviet Union and U.S.A. As India was keen to play an 
effective role in the international arena, it thought proper to keep aA\ ay from 
these blocks. Emphasising this point Pandit Nehru, it may be observed that the 
policy of non-alignment was dictated by the consideration of national interest. 
Because of its liberal traditions India could not align itself with So\iet Union 
which believed in ideology of violence and revolution. On the other hand her 
geographical location (with Soviet Union and China close to her border) 
demanded that she should not join the western alliance. The traditional attitude 
of tolerance also impelled India to remain non-aligned, neutrality which does 
not convey the real nature of India's foreign policy. Nehru 'neutral' to 
describe India's foreign policy is wrong except in terms of war, if you say 
there is war on today we are neutral. If there is cold war, we are certainly 
neutral. We do not propose to join that war, not in any way hampered India's 
friendly co-operation with other countries. Concluded number of agreements 
for economists, cultural and political cooperation. India strongly condemned 
the North Korean aggression against South Korea in 1950, Anglo-French 
invasion of Suez in 1956, the Soviet intervention in Hungary and U.S. use of 
force in Vietnam. This policy of non-alignment proved immensely beneficial 
to the country. This policy apart from serving the national interest of India also 
went a long way in strengthening the cause of world peace. 
(2) ANTI-COLONIALISM AND ANTI IMPERIALISM: 
Another outstanding principle of India's fneign policy has been 
her strong opposition to colonialism and imperialism. This policy was largely 
the outcome of her long sufference as colony under the British. This anti-
colonial and anti-imperialist India was not confined to mere pronouncements. 
Support to Indonesia, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco etc. Thus India 
extended full support to Indonesia when the Government of Netherlands tried 
to overpower it and played a vital role in Indonesia's independence. India also 
supported the people of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and helped them to 
free themselves from the yoke of military regime of Pakistan. India extended 
support for decolonisation of Namibia and South Africa and provide facilities 
to SWAPO and the ANC to set up their mission in New Delhi. 
(3) OPPOSITION TO RACIALISM: 
India has always emphasised the principle of brotherhood of man 
and opposed all types of discriminations on race and culture. It was the first 
country to highlight the problem of racial discrimination at the international 
level, severally condemned the policy of racial segregation being pursued by 
the government of South Africa. It sought international intervention to 
pressurise the white Government of South Africa to abandon the policy of 
racial discrimination of apartheid at the U.N. India took up the cause of the 
Negroes in America and Africa population of Rhodesia. It has consistently 
condemned racialist policies of South Africa and demanded sanctions against 
Pretoria to compel it to release political prisoners and repeal apartheid laws. 
(4) FAITH IN PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 
AND COOPERATION: 
India was not merely satisfied to adopted policy of non-
alignment but also tried to promote the spirit of co-operation and peaceful 
coexistence among the states professing different ideologies. India cultivated 
very intimate relations with China, Nepal, Yugoslavia, Egypt etc. mutual 
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, 
non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs mutual benefit and equality 
and peaceful coexistence. The firm faith of India in these principles is evident 
from the fact that despite the Chinese betrayal in 1962 India has persistently 
expressed its faith in these principles. 
(5) SPECIAL BIAS FOR ASIA: 
Even though India advocated co-operation among all the 
countries of the world, it shows a social bias for the countries of Asia in its 
foreign policy. It developed very close relations with countries of Asia. Nehru 
emphasised that Asia could play an effective role in promoting the world 
peace and play a dominant role in the shaping of the international relations. 
Nehru emphasised the important role which Asia could play in the 
preservation and promotion of world peace. In this atomic age, Asia will have 
to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed, there can be no 
peace unless Asia plays her part. India took a lead in organising some 
conferences of the Asian countries during the period 1947 and 1949 but their 
chief purpose was to promote co-operation among the countries of Asia. 
(6) INTIMATE RELATIONS WITH COMMONWEALTH: 
Intimacy of relations with commonwealth has been another 
important feature of India's foreign policy. India sought the membership of 
commonwealth even after adopting a Republican constitution, because it 
thought that the membership of commonwealth shall be beneficial in the 
economic and other spheres. 
(7) FAITH IN THE UNITED NATIONS: 
India as a proponent of peace has shown great faith in the United 
Nations. It provided necessary personnels for the observation group in 
Lebanon which performed the stupendous task of checking the infiltration of 
personnel and supply of arms etc. across the Lebanese border. India also sent a 
large contingent to preserve peace in Congo. The valuable service rendered by 
India to the United Nations. India also contributed contingents to the United 
Nations Iran-Iraq military observe group constituted to supervise ceasefire 
between Iran and Iraq which commenced on 20 August, 1988. 
(8) SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON MEANS: 
India has consistently held that the means for the attainment of 
national interest must be pious. India has always nourished very high ideas and 
has never aspired to acquire territory of other countries. This is fully bom out 
by the fact that India returned to Pakistan her territory which she had captured 
during the 1965 and 1971 wars. 
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1962 
Lai Bahadur Shastri, who succeeded Nehru as Prime Minister 
tried to cultivate friendly and intimate relations with neighbours like Nepal, 
Burma and Sri Lanka as well as the two super powers. He succeeded in 
procuring military and economic assistance from both powers and greatly 
strengthened India's position. Palmer and Perkins have asserted that the 
Chinese attack came as a traumatic shock to India and caused a searching of 
India's Foreign Policy and her whole approach to the problems of national 
security and extemal relation. It is true that methods of foreign policy after 
1962 underwent a change but the basic principles of India's foreign policy 
continued to be the same. Another outstanding feature of the India's foreign 
policy during the Shastri era was that the emphasis shifted to collective 
decision making. The public involvement in the formulation of foreign policy 
also increased. However, the basic principles of foreign policy remained 
unaltered. 
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER INDIRA GANDHI 
After the sudden death of Shastri, Mrs. Indira Gandhi became 
the Prime Minister. Like her predecessors she took keen interest in the conduct 
of foreign policy. During the first few years she took all major foreign policy 
decisions in consultation with other prominent members of government and 
party. Collective decision making, with the passage of time she asserted 
herself and started formulating foreign policies with the assistance of some of 
her close and trusted colleagues and ft-iends to secure large financial and 
military assistance from U.S.A. She also cultivated intimate relations with 
Soviet Union which culminated in the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 
friendship and co-operation in 1971. 
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FOREIGN POLICY UNDER JANTA PARTY 
With the formation of the Janta Government in 1977 it was 
expected that a drastic change in India's foreign policy would take place. This 
feeling was largely the outcome of the fact that while in opposition leaders of 
the Janta Party had severely condemned India's tilt towards Soviet Union. Atal 
Behari Vajpayee, the then External Affairs Minister had particularly been a 
bitter critic of India's growing intimacy with Soviet Union and considered it a 
violation of the principle of genuine non-alignment. However, he made it clear 
that the new government wanted to pursue a policy of genuine non-alignment. 
The Janta Government, therefore, tried to develop very intimate relations with 
both the super powers and bring about greater balance and subriety. The ne\\ 
government continued friendly relations with the Soviet Union realising it 
fully well that India had immensely benefited from the close connections with 
Soviet Union through supply of sophisticated military hardwares, assistance in 
diversification of country's economy through establishment of basic industries 
and ever expanding trade between the two countries. The Janta Government 
also tried to improve relations with U.S.A. which had been cooling off since 
1967. A new chapter was opened in Indo-U.S relations with the visit of 
President Carter. Another outstanding feature of the Janta foreign policy was 
an attempt to develop more closer relations with the neighbouring countries. 
Atal Behari Vajpayee said in his address at a seminar held at the Indian School 
of International Studies, "The Janta Government from the first day of its 
existence set out deliberately to clear the cobwebs of suspicion, remove 
misunderstanding, and banish the fear of interference. The Janta Government 
took a number of concrete steps to improve its relations with neighbouring 
countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal etc. by coming to an understanding 
regarding some of the outstanding disputes. Thus it reached an agreement with 
Pakistan on the question of salal dam in Kashmir. It concluded a agreement on 
farakka with Bangladesh which was an improvement oxer the interim 
agreement concluded by Mrs. Indira Gandhi with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
earlier. The Janta Government tried to improve its relations with China for 
two reasons. First, uneasy relations with China in the past had distorted the 
priorities of the country by imposing a heavy defence burden. Secondly, it was 
desirable to cultivate friendly relations with Beijing so that Pakistan may not 
revert to its old stance. 
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER RAJIV 
Rajiv Gandhi continued the foreign policy of Nehru and Indira 
Gandhi and reaffirmed his faith in the United Nations, the non-aligned 
movement, opposition to colonialism, old or new in his ver>' first broadcast to 
the nation on 12 November 1984. He also indicated his determination to work 
for niirrowing international economic disparities, develop closer relations with 
immediate neighbours, pursue policy of non-interference, peaceful co-
existence and non-alignment, promised to pursue the concept of common 
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regional development of South Asia, improvement and strengthening of 
relations with China, Soviet Union and State. 
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NATIONAL AND 
JANATA(S) GOVERNMENT 
The National Front Government which came into power in 
November 1989 reiterated its determination to continue policy of non-
alignment. However, it expressed its desire to effect improvement in relations 
with-immediate neighbours which had got strained during the past few years. 
Soon after assumption of power it initiated moves to hold talks with the 
leaders of Nepal. SriLanka and Pakistan to remove some of the irritants 
present in the relations of India with these countries. The Janata Dal(S) which 
came to power after the fall of V.P. Singh Government, also continued the 
policy of the earlier governments and did not make any change in the 
traditional foreign policy of the country. 
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NARASHIMHA RAO 
Narashimha Rao assumed office at time when world had 
undergone complete change due to breaking of ideological Barriers, the end of 
cold war and adjustments in power equations due to disintegration of Soviet 
Union. It tried to forge closer relations with USA and responded favourably to 
US proposals for military co-operation. The new government also initiated 
n 
moves to improve relations with the countries of Europe and settle outstanding 
disputes with the neighbouring countries. The foreign policy of India has all 
along been based on the principles already discussed. However, it has been 
undergoing constant changes in keeping with the requirements of the situation 
to suit national interest. 
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER UNITED FRONT GOVERNMENT 
The United Front Government, a coalition of 13 parties, which 
came into power in June 1996 continued the earlier foreign polic>. However, it 
laid great emphasis on improvement of relation with the neighbouring 
countries, it put forth Gujral Doctrine under which unilateral concessions were 
made to the neighbouring coimtries with regard to travel and trade, without 
expecting reciprocity. Effort was also made to promote free trade among the 
SAARC countries and convert it into an economic union at the earliest. 
Another notable feature of the Gujral doctrine was to eliminate the basis for 
outside intervention in the region. This is evident from the refusal of the nev^  
government to accept the offer of mediation by USA. Britain and Iran in 
Kashmir dispute. In other words the new government tried to make it clear to 
the various powers to keep out of South Asia. 
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FOREIGN POLICY UNDER BJP LED 
COALITION GOVERNMENT 
The BJP led coalition government which came into power in 
1998, which adhering to the basic principles of India's foreign policy gave a 
new orientation to the foreign policy which is more realistic than moralistic 
with regard to neighbouring countries it favoured more intimate relations but 
did not ^prove of unilateral concessions as done by Gujral Government, it 
insists on reciprocity. Under the new policy greater emphasis is being laid on 
security of the country. On this plea India conducted explosions at Pokhran in 
May 1998. In short, of late India has emerged as a self-centred country which 
is trying to pursue national interests single mindedly rather than following 
abstract universal goals. It is evident from the preceeding account that India's 
foreign policy has been based on stable principles and its directions have 
remained firmly steady. Further, it has stood the test of the time and helped 
India to play a dynamic role in the international affairs. 
INDIA AND SOUTH - EAST ASIA 
India's relations with countries of South-East Asia viz. Burma, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia (Kampuchea) are to be viewed in the context of her overall foreign 
policy and her relations with the big power. In 1949 India took a lead in 
convening a conference on Indonesia and projected itself as leader of the anti-
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colonial struggle in Asia. However, India wanted to see the area free from 
communist domination and therefore expressed reservations about the 
liberation movement in Indo-China under Hochiminh. India's relation with 
countries of South Asia entered a new phase after the Indo-Pakistan war of 
1965. During the war Indonesia extended whole hearted support to Pakistan 
and described India as an aggressor. North Vietnam and Cambodia also 
criticised India, largely because of her failure to take a firm stand against the 
U.S. aggression. This provided East Asia. No doubt the countries of South-
East Asia attached more importance to their relations with China and Japan, 
but they could not completely ignore India an account of her close relations 
with the U.S.S.R. The conclusion of Indo-Soviet treaty in 1971 created further 
apprehensions in the minds of South-East countries that this would lead to 
increase in the Soviet sphere of influence. In January 1992 the association of 
South East Asia nations (ASEAN) at its summit held in Singapore accepted 
India as a sectoral partner in specific areas like trade, investment, science and 
technology and training in the hope that it would help the process of global 
economic integration. 
The range of services which India can offer and the better 
educational facilities available the country provide considerable 
complementarity. 
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RELATIONS WITH ASEAN 
The association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN) consisting 
of Indonesia, Malaysia , the Philipines, Singapore and Thailand, come into 
being in 1967. This association was formed with a view:-
(a) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region, (b) to promote regional peace and stability, (c) to 
promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in matters of common 
interest in the economic, social, cultural, and administrative field, (d) to 
provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities 
in the educational professional, technical and administrative spheres, (e) to 
promote South East Asian studies, and (f) to collaborate for the greater 
utilisation of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade etc. 
The future relations of India with South-East Asian countries 
would to a large extent depend on the solution of the Kampuchean problems. 
There are three alternatives. Firstly, a non-aligned Vietnam dealing with both 
the superpowers on equal terms may be accepted by the ASEAN members as 
non-aggressive. This may in turn provide scope for India to have better 
relations with most of the South-East Asian countries. Secondly, a 
Kampuchea, free from occupation of Vietnam and reoccupied by the Pol pot 
Government may compel India to review her stand to the satisfaction of 
ASEAN. Thirdly, a broad understanding between Vietnam and Thailand to 
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fight the Pol Pot forces may also indirectly pave the way for better Indo-South 
East Asian relations. 
INDIA AND BANGLADESH 
India's relations with Bangladesh have been quite intimate. In 
fact India played a leading role in the creation of the Bangladesh as state. The 
Bangladesh's leadership acknowledged the India help with gratitude and 
indicated its desire to work in close co-operation with India. In 1972 India and 
Bangladesh signed a treaty of friendship, co-operation. In the social, economic 
and cultural fields, also the two countries tried to strengthen their bonds and 
concluded a number of agreements. Similarly in the field of science and 
technology of the two countries agreed to cooperate. The two countries also 
amicably settled certain issues regarding border between the two countries. 
The main issues which contributed to new tension in relations between India 
and Bangladesh, include, clashes over borders, dispute over Farakka, barrage, 
dispute over moore Island. Migration of minorities in Bangladesh and flow of 
migrants across border. On 7 January, 1983 an accord was signed which made 
new arrangements for sharing of Ganga water for two years. Thereafter also 
the joint River Commission has held a number of meetings but failed to find 
out a mutually acceptable solution. Finally in November, 1985 the two 
countries reached an accord on sharing of Ganga water. The other issues 
which have strained relations between India and Bangladesh include the issues 
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of sharing of Ganga waters, illegal immigration of Chakma refugees, treatment 
of minorities, demarcation of maritime boundaries. 
INDIA AND BHUTAN 
Bhutan is located on the northern flank of narrow strip of Indian 
territory and lies within India's strategic defence parameter. India concluded a 
treaty of friendship with Bhutan in 1949 whereby the latter agreed to be 
guided in its foreign relations by New Delhi. Bhutan came closer to India after 
the suppression of Tibetan revoU by China in 1959 and Sino-Indian conflict of 
1962, in 1971 Bhutan became a member of the United Nations. In 1978 
Bhutan renamed its mission in New Delhi as Royal Bhutan Embassy, which 
was symbolic of qualitative change in Indo-Bhutanese relations. In 1979 
Bhutan established diplomatic relations with Bangladesh. The Indo-Bhutanese 
ties received a boost as a result of four day official visit by king Jigme Singya 
Wangchuk to India in September 1991. On this occasion the two countries 
signed an agreement on civil aviation to provide legal framework for operation 
of air services between the two countries. India also agreed to provide 
assistance for the seventh five plan of Bhutan beginning in 1992. The two 
countries also reached an agreement for further exploitation of hydel potential 
of Bhutan and India agreed to work on two new giant hydel projects Chukha 
phase II and Chukha phase III that India has developed very intimate relation 
with Bhutan. India forms a vital life line for Bhutanese economy and security 
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and Bhutanese leadership can hardly afford to left their relations with India 
cool down. 
INDIA AND BURMA (MAYANMAR) 
India has maintained intimate relations with Burma (Mayanmar) 
since earliest times. Burma fell under the influence of Buddhism, which still 
continues to be a dominant element in Burma's social life. The country was 
conquered by the British and made a part of the Indian Empire. The conquest 
of Burma by the British started with the conquest of Arakan and Tennasse 
coast in 1826, followed by annexation of lower Burma in 1852 and upper 
Burma in 1856. Burma from the very beginning tried to maintain friendly 
relations with India as well as China. With the democratic movement in 
Burma gaining popularity in 1989-90, it looked that the relations between 
India and Burma would show an improvement. Relations between India and 
Burma remained quite cold during the next few years. In January 1992 the two 
countries concluded two agreements for the economic development of the 
areas along with the international border to help keep firm check on 
insurgencies and drug trades. It is hoped that the closer economic relations 
between the two countries would pave way for dialogue an large issues of 
peace and security in the region. 
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INDIA AND CHINA 
India's China policy and Sino-Indo relations have been the 
subject of much controversy in the last decade and a half. The pendulum 
seems to be swinging from one end to the other. All through the seventies and 
early eighties the China policy was mercilessly criticised as ha\ing been 
unrealistic, rarely pro-peking, wholly headed and what not China became a 
Frankenstein in the Indian wind, every action of it wicked and sinister and the 
whole basis of Nehru's policy of the fifties was questiones and challenged by 
vocal opinion which did everything possible to stroke popular excitement and 
hysteria. Now a sizable reaction of vocal opinion has begun the questioning 
from the other hand. It is only a question of time before Sino-Indian relations 
are normalised. 
Here one important thing is that good neighbourliness is the 
beginning of a sound foreign policy and country foreign policy is more 
generally its first and the best defence. India's current relations within the 
region a far cry from the era of Asian relation conference and periodical 
meetings of Colombo powers in 1960's. The renewed efforts now being made 
to improve Indo-China relations require better understanding of the Chinese 
point of view by the public in India. In the fifties, our two countries jointly 
initiated the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial, 
integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other matter, equality and 
mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence and these principles have now 
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become norms guiding relations between nations these are know as Panchshila 
agreement. And normalisation of Sino-Indian relationship could open new 
doors and assist the process of a positive restructuring of relationship in the 
subcontinent. 
INDIA, INDONESIA AND VIETNAM 
It is the result of Indian recognition that Indonesia and Vietnam 
as regionally preeminent powers in archipelagic and mainland South-East Asia 
respectively share an important characteristic with India in terms of their 
regional status. Indian perception is buttressed by the fact that the Vietnamese 
and Indonesian antagonism towards China are, if anything, based on ever more 
solid historical foundations than is the case with India's attitude towards 
Beijing. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam particularly stirred anti Chinese 
emotions in India for two reasons. First, it was launched while the then Indian 
foreign minister, A.B. Vajpayee, was on a visit to China, the first such visit in 
two decades. The timing of the attack was a source of great embarrassment for 
the Indian Government and the minister had to cut short his visit as an act of 
protest. New Delhi, inflating its own importance in Chinese calculations, 
interpreted the timing as a deliberate Chinese attempt to spoil India's relations 
with Vietnam. Second, and more important, the Chinese invision of Vietnam 
very strongly reminded policy-makers and opinion-moulders in New Delhi of 
the Chinese incursion into India across the Himalayas in October 1962, also 
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ostensibly to teach India a lesson. This Indian image was strengthened by the 
Chinese statements issued at the time of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam 
which were almost identical to those issued by Beijing during the Sino-Indian 
border war. 
INDIA AND NEPAL 
Nepal is located in the north of Uttar Pradesh and the southern 
slopes of the Himalayas and can very well be treated as a geographical 
extension of India. The two countries have maintained very intimate cultural, 
religious and economic links. The two countries maintain very close economic 
links and the trade between the two countries has considerably increased over 
the years. India's relations with Nepal got severely strained towards the close 
of March 1989 due to differences between the two over the signing of new 
trade and transit treaties. As a result of this controversy the earlier Indo-Nepal 
transit treaty of 1978 lapsed and the traditional friendly relations between the 
two countries government strained due to acute shortage of diesel, petrol, coal 
and other essential goods in Nepal. After assumption of power by the National 
front Government in India's effort were once again made to improve relation 
with Nepal and restore status quo ante to April 1, 1987 in trade and transit 
arrangements. This agreement contributed to the normalisation of Indo-
Nepalese relations. In December 1991 the Prime Minister of two countries 
held a summit meeting at New Delhi and concluded five agreements. In 
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October, 1992 India reached an understanding with Nepal regarding expansion 
of bilateral co-operation and agreed to enhance Nepalese exports to India by 
permitting Nepalese products duty free and quota free access to Indian market. 
Thus once again India's relations with Nepal developed along normal lines. In 
November, 1994 with the formation of the first communist Government in 
Nepal. Despite these improvements disagreement still persists between India 
and Nepal on several issues such as trade facilities, sharing of water and 
power, smuggling and movement of terrorists across the border and 
involvement of Nepal in the affairs of peoples of Nepalese origin settled in 
India. 
INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
Since 1947 the relations between the two countries have been 
persistently strained. The main factors which have contributed to the strained 
relations between the two countries are disputes over properties borders, 
distribution of river waters, the question of Kashmir etc. Pakistan has been 
trying to act as the champion of the Muslims of India and propagating that 
India was essentially a Hindu state and Muslims of India are being treated as 
second class citizens. Pakistan has tried to give even the usual problems 
between the two countries a communal colour. The most important issue 
which has continued to strain the relations between the two countries 
throughout the years is the Kashmir question. The question of Kashmir has 
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been a constant in the relationship of India and Pakistan. The Kashmir issue 
also involved the two countries in two serious wars in 1965 and 1971. In the 
wake of the creation of Bangladesh, India's relations with Pakistan entered a 
new chapter. The leaders of the t\vo countries concluded and signed an 
agreement at Shimla in July, 1972 which provided a new turn to their 
relations. The two countries agreed to settle their differences through bilateral 
negotiations in peaceful manner, they expressed faith in the principles of 
peaceful co-existence and non-interference in internal affairs of each other. 
The two countries agreed to cooperate in the economic, cultural 
scientific field. A new element of tension was introduced in the relations 
between the two countries as a result of the decision of Arab countries to 
provide Pakistan with $ 1000 million for the purchase of sophisticated arms. 
This has greatly disturbed the balance of power between India and Pakistan 
and poses a serious threat to India's security. The acquisition of 16 air crafts 
fom U.S.A. has also contributed to tremendous increase in Pakistan's striking 
ability. A welcome development in Indo-Pak relations took place in May 1989 
when the two countries agreed to take a series of new and concrete measures 
to contain terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling and illicit border crossing. In 
September 1991, Pakistani troops along with the Kashmir militants attacked 
Kemi area of Poonch sector, but the attack was successfully repulsed. In 
October 1991, Pakistan attacked an Indian outpost in Kargil but here also the 
Pakistani attack was repulsed. The relations between the two countries have 
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continued to be quite strained due to Pakistan's support to terrorist in Punjab 
and Kashmir. The other factors which have generated tension between India 
and Pakistan include Pakistan's growing linkages with fundamentalists, trans-
border smuggling of weapons and drugs determination of maritime boundary, 
discriminatory trade barriers against India and treatment meted out to the 
minorities in Pakistan . 
INDIA AND SRILANKA 
Srilanka is located to the coast of south East India. A large 
number of Indians are settled in Srilanka. They are mainly employed in the 
field of tea and rubber plantations of the country. Two countries have also 
maintained close cooperation in the economic field. Both are members of the 
non-aligned movement and share identical views most of the international 
problems. The only irritant in the relations between India and Srilanka is the 
problem of the people of Indian origin in Srilanka. 
Signing of an accord between prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and 
President Jayewardene on 29 July, 1987. In terms of this accord the Tamil 
majority northern and eastern provinces were to be emerged to make one 
single province to ensure distinct Tamil nationality without disturbing integrity 
of Srilanka. President of Srilanka was given the discretion to invite an Indian 
peace-keeping contingent to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilies in 
Jaffna. India agreed to provide such military assistance for the implementation 
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of the accord as may be requested by Srilankan government. India's relations 
with Srilanka showed some improvement after the assumption of power by the 
National Front Government. It expedited the process of withdrawal of forces 
from Srilanka. In January 1991 the two countries reached an agreement that 
the tlnal solution to the fixed ethnic problem of Srilanka could be resolved 
onh through political settlement. The two countries also agreed to upgrade the 
existing joint trade committees. In October 1992 president Premadasa of 
Srilanka paid a visit to India. During this visit, India expressed support for the 
proposal for effective devolution of power within the framework of an early 
solution of the ethnic conflict in Srilanka. The visit of president Chandrika 
Kumaratunga of Srilanka to Indian in 1995, helped in re-establishing the 
mutualh beneficial ties between the two countries. During her visit to India 
she proposed a free trade and investment agreement to boost the economic 
cooperation between the two countries. 
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INDIA, FOREIGN POLICY, AFGHANISTAN 
1. KAUR (Kulwant). Recent developments in Afghanistan and its 
impact on India's security. Punjab Journal of Politics. 4(1); 
January-June, 1980; 10-27 p. 
The emergence of super-power politics in south and south west Asia, with the 
USSR's intervention in Afghanistan and the US decision to rearm Pakistan, 
has created concern in India regarding the security and peace of the region. 
Though contrary to the Western countries propaganda the present situation in 
Afghanistan does not seem to pose direct or immediate threat to India's 
security, yet in the long run it can pose a serious challenge, as building and 
expansion of bases and copious discharge of arms to the Asian countries has 
been kept up on this pretext. India has disapproved the super power move to 
seek military solution to the crisis, rather favoured them to follow a hands off 
policy in this region. To defuse the crisis, India has been persuading Moscow 
to withdraw its forces on the one hand and trying to convince Pakistan to 
initiate direct talks with Afghanistan on the other. 
2. VAIDIK (V.P). India and Afghanistan. International studies. 17(3-4); 
July-December; 1978; 529-541p. 
India recognized the Afghan government immediately after the coup d'etat of 
April 1978. Criticized as communist by western governments, the new 
government has received support from India and above all from the USSR. 
Serious disagreements, separate the India and Afghan governments. India does 
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not share the Afghan views on the question of liberation of Pakhtoonistan and 
on the question of stability of Pakistan. India maintains that the principle of 
self-determination should not be pressed too far and that the principle should 
be applied only to those nations, and territories which are under the 
subjugation of foreign powers. Economic exchange between the two countries 
are difficult to maintain, but should be encouraged so that cultural and 
educational relations can be fostered. 
3. VIVEKANANDAN (B). Afghanistan invasion viewed from India. 
Asia Pacific Community. 9( 4); summer, 1980; 63-82p. 
India's initial reaction was firm and in line with its policy of "genuine non-
alignment" prime minister Charan Singh criticized the Soviet incursion into 
Afghan and demanded that Soviet troops should withdraw from Afghanistan 
soil as their continued presence would have adverse consequences for the 
entire region. However, indications of a departure from the official line 
initially adopted have appeared. Even before Indira Gandhi took the oath of 
office she said that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not one-sided. 
Significantly, the Indian government does not press for the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops. India's security interests suggest that her concerns over Pakistan 
and China make her Soviet ties very important, but the long term presence of 
Soviet troops so close to her borders is not welcomed. 
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_, BANGLADESH 
4. BANERJEE (Paula), HAZARIKA (Sanjoy) and SAMADDAR 
(Ranabir), Indo-Bangladesh cross border migration and trade. 
Economic and political weekly. 34(36); September, 1999; 254-255p. 
This article discusses almost all of the outstanding issues between India and 
Bangladesh related to disputes along the common border. The article put forth 
a few suggestions for successful negotiation of the immigration problems 
which is also linked to the larger issue of enhanced sub-regional 
communication and trade. Both India and Bangladesh have proved woefully 
inadequate in dealing with the reality of the border between the two countries. 
The dispute over the boundary between Murshidabad and Rajshahi was a 
typical example of these initial disputes where even the tribunal decided that 
the demarcation of the line made by the boundary commission "is found be 
impossible". The problem of cross border migration is sometimes complicated 
by religious factor. A system of identity card acceptable to local population, 
particularly those living on the border is the eastern and north eastern region 
has to be ensured. Trade between India and Bangladesh has not increased 
substantially despite 12 years of South Asian Association for regional co-
operation and the South Asia preferential trading agreement. 
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5. BANERJEE (Subrata). Emerging Indo-Bangla relations. World 
Focus. 15 (11-12); November-December, 1984; 27-30 p. 
There have been indications of some change in economic relations between 
India and Bangladesh. The Indo-Bangladesh joint economic committee of 
industries associations of both countries has been meeting the Bangladesh 
Government expressed interest in projects for setting up gas based power 
paper pulp plant in the joint sector on either side of the border for mutual 
sharing of products. Bangladesh today has an adverse balance of trade of about 
Rs. 1,000 crore in relation to India. India should grant more tariff concessions 
to Bangladsh. It has been suggested by Bangladeshi economists, concerned 
with improving relations between the two countries, that India should permit 
duty-free imports from Bangladesh on a non-reciprocal basis for a period of 
five years to help that country build up its export base. 
6. CHOUDHURY (Dilara). India-Bangladesh ties; from euphoria to 
pragmatism. Regional studies. 7 (2); spring, 1989; 38-66 p. 
The Indo-Bangladesh relationship has gone through various phases ranging 
from euphoria to pragmatism to hostility. The shift from euphoria came about 
after the change of government in Dhaka in 1975 when policy makers tried to 
assert Bangladesh's sovereignty and national interest. The outstanding 
disputes between the two countries continued to simmer until Rajiv Gandhi's 
coming to power in 1984 which marked a trend towards improved relations 
and gave a chance to both countries to shed their pre-independence and 
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inherited inhibitions. The hopes were raised by the newly formed South Asian 
Association for regional cooperation. There have been no substantive changes 
in the Indo-Bangladesh relationship so far and at present correct but not 
friendly. The sooner trends toward better understanding between the two 
emerge the better it would be for the South Asian region as any destabilization 
of Bangladesh would have far-reaching consequences for all the seven 
countries of South Asia. 
7. HOSSAIN (Ishtiaq). Bangladesh-India relations: issues and 
problems. Asian Survey .21(11); November. 1981; 1115-1128 p. 
Since 1971 a number of issues have not only clouded Bangladesh-India 
relations, but have also led to the exchange of fire between the two countries. 
Bangladesh-India relations began down ward slump in March 1972 when 
grumblings were heard among political circles in Bangladesh. As the decade 
of the 1970's rolled on, more issues, the dispute over the maritime belt, Indian 
support for the pro-Mujib guerrillas, the sharing of Ganges waters, and 
disputes over the Muhurir char and purbasha island in the bay of Bengal-have 
seriously undermined friendly relations between Bangladesh and India. The 
article thoroughly examines those issues and analyses the positions taken by 
both countries on these problems. 
8. HOSSAIN (Ishtiaq). Bangladesh-India relation: the Ganges water 
sharing treaty and beyond. Asian Affairs: An American Review. 
25(3); Winter, 1998; 131-150 p. 
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The articles first traces the negotiation held between India on the one hand and 
Pakistan and then Bangladesh from 1950 to 1996. Both India and Pakistan and 
later Bangladesh, approached the dispute from the point of view of their 
national interest. The April 1975 interim agreement, valid for only forty-one 
days, was signed by Bangladesh and India to enable the commissioning of the 
Farakka Beirrage. The 1977 treaty was the first major agreement between the 
two countries on the sharing of the Ganges River. In the second part, analysis 
is made of the negotiations on the sharing of the Ganges water by the Awami 
League government in Dhaka and the terms of the 1996 treaty, its strengths 
and weakness, and the reasons that enabled it to be successfully concluded. 
The article examines the positive impact of the 1996 Ganges water-sharing 
treaty on Bangladesh-India relations and explores the possibility of 
development of sub-regional groupings among Bangladesh, India, Nepal and 
Bhutan. 
9. ISLAM (Nahid). Indo-Bangladesh common rivers: the impact on 
Bangladesh. Contemporarv South Asia. 1(2); June, 1992; 203-225p. 
This article deals with the ecological issue which become a prime component 
of security considerations. The problem of the Indo-Bangladesh common 
rivers is one important example. The environmental and legal issues arising 
from the sharing of these rivers, and the diplomatic problems over water usage 
will have an impact on Bangladesh's economy, society and indeed its security 
in the long term. Fifty seven rivers are common to India and Bangladesh, the 
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major rivers being the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna. However 
with approximately 90% of the catchment area of the total river system located 
outside the country, Bangladesh's situation is very vulnerable. India's 
technical capability to harness water for irrigation purpose, together with the 
need to boost food production, renders it unaccommodating. Bangladesh's 
altemating flood and drought, river erosion, siltation and salinity affect the 
entire ecology to such an extent that the survival of the country is put into 
question. If Bangladesh continues to suffer environmental degradation on this 
scale, there is a danger that Bangladeshi refugees will pour into India: The 
multinational character of the river system necessitates multinational 
cooperation for bilateral and regional security. 
10. MUNI (S.D.) India and its neighbours; persisting dilemmas and new 
opportunities. International Studies. 30 (2); April - June, 1993; 
189-206 p. 
The Indian policy must address the task of building a stable, and cooperative 
neighbourhood. The trends discernible in India's interaction with its 
neighbours suggest two clearly identifiable patterns. One is marked by close 
interaction - as with Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Srilanka. 
Such interaction could grow in positive content and also dissent and diverge 
but remain generally manageable. The thrust in this interaction will be on 
economic issues, requiring greater Indian initiative and push. The other pattern 
is characterized by distrust and intense acrimony as in the relations between 
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India and Pakistan. The more there is internal political conflict within India 
and Pakistan, the more the relations between the two countries could worsen. 
However, section of Pakistani opinion may be made to see the need for 
improvement in their country's ties with India. 
11. MUNSI (Sunil). Indo - Bangladesh and share of Ganga water. 
Mainstream. 16 (1-6); December, 1977; 49-52 p. 
India's P.M. Morarji Desai met Bangladesh President Zia-ur-Rehman in 
London during the Common Wealth and discussed the question that India had 
renewed its offer of building a canal linking the Brahamputra and the Ganga to 
settle the dispute over the sharing of water with Bangladesh. On the other 
hand, on July 26, it was alleged in Rajya Sabha that the proposed meeting at 
Dacca appeared to by solely for the endorsement of an agreement according to 
which India would be contented with only half of 40,000 cusecs of water from 
Farakka needed to save the Calcutta port and that India would restrict her use 
of Ganga water to 10% till the plan to augment the Ganga flow was accepted. 
It is now generally known that the Government of India had agreed to release 
20 thousands cusecs of additional water to Bangladesh during the lean month 
by cutting down the supply of an equal quantity to the Hooghly Bhagirathi 
system. 
12. NAYAR (Kuldip). New Government in Dhaka Unfolds new 
prospects. Mainstream. 34 (33); July, 1996; 17-18 p. 
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The Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad spoke to I.K. Gujral from Dhaka. It 
reflects the warmth of the relationship. There is an overflowing feeling of 
friendship that had got for the last 21 years when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was 
killed. India helped Bangladesh in its liberation struggle. People in Bangladesh 
have been fed on misinformation about India. On the other hand Sheikh 
Hasina's return has given another opportunity to both the countries. There will 
be a sprit of give and take which our Foreign Secretary percieved during his 
visit. Salman Haither seems to hinge on the sharing of the Ganges water. They 
have suffered a great deal in the last 14 years. West Bengal Chief Minister 
Jyoti Basu seems to favour the division of waters more or less in the same 
proportion as was done earliers. Once the issue of water is out of the way the 
anti-India lobby will be defeated. 
13. PAUL (Bhaskar). Indo Bangla accord: holding no water. India today. 
22 (1-8); April, 1997; p 77. 
The Indo-Bangladesh treaty on the sharing of Ganga water signed in 
December last year not only quench the two countries need for water but also 
to wash away hate and suspicion that divided them. The agreement of water 
was between 1949 and 1988. But the water flow has declined since 1988 
when U.P. and Bihar began drawing 25,000-45,000 cusecs through irrigation 
projects before the water reached Farakka bridge. Bangladesh is losing out. 
During March 11 to March 20 it received only 21,000 cusecs against the 
agreed share of 35,000 cusecs. Government of the two countries are not 
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directly responsible for the drop in water levels. India is now pressing for 
sharing of waters on 50-50 basis by keeping the agreed formulae as long as 
water availability at Farakka is belwo 50,000 cusecs. Calcutta port requires a 
flow of 40,000 cusecs to maintain its navigational channel. 
14. RAY (Jayanta Kumar). India and Bangladesh: the Farakka 
Agreement. International Studies. 17 (2); April - June, 1978; 235 -
246 p. 
This article deals with the allocation of water by Farakka Agreement between 
India and Bangladesh. In the leanest ten days (21-30 April) during January to 
May. India is to get 20,500 cusecs, and Bangladesh 34,500 cusecs. In the least 
lean ten days (I-IO January) India is to receive 40,000 cusecs, and Bangladesh 
58,500 cusecs. The only justification for the Farakka Agreement of November 
1977 appears to be the expectation of the Government of India that it would 
facilitate the adoption of a long-term scheme to agreement the flow of Ganges 
water, a scheme that may remove Indo-Bangladesh discord by ensuring an 
abundance of waters and make the issue of water-sharing irrelevant, and that 
by its short-term sacrifice India would be able to inspire that trust in 
Bangladesh which would do away with the sacrifice in the long run. 
15. SATYAMURTHY (T.V). Indo-Bangladesh relations: a structural 
perspective. Asia Quarterly. 1(1); January, 1977; 52-75 p. 
The circumstances under which the state of Bangladesh was formed favoured 
India's political intervention. This intervention culminated in the military 
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invasion of East Pakistan which led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. 
India's strategy was to give full support to the Awami League led by Shaikh 
Mujibur Rahman to the exclusion of any other political force in East Pakistan. 
During the twenty four years that it constituted a part of Pakistan East and 
Pakistan was reduced to the status of a depend colony. The formation of 
Bangladesh, relations with India were quickly resumed, especially in the 
economic sphere, but in the absence of a viable nationally controlled 
infrastructure the economic relations between Bangladesh and India have been 
marked by domination and dependence rather than by mutual equality. 
16. SINGH (Kuldeep). Border disputes between India and Bangladesh. 
Foreign Affairs Reports. 36 (6); June, 1987; 85-92 p. 
The relations between India and Bangladesh have become increasingly 
strained in recent years. This is largely due to three different border disputes; 
the influx of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh into India, the dispute over 
new moore Island located at the mouth of the river Muhuri which forms the 
natural border between the two countries, and the controversy over the Muhuri 
charland, 50 acres of newly surfaced farmland on the Muhuri River. The most 
important of these problems is that concerning the immigration of Bangladesh 
refugees into India, and especially attempts made by India to erect a fence 
along its frontiers to tighten border control, which Bangladesh views as a 
direct affront. These disputes must be settled in order to obtain peace and 
security in the region. 
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17. TANDON (R). India and Bangladesh relation. Economic and 
Political Weekly. 28 (31); May, 1981; 923-925 p. 
The dispute over "new more" or 'purbhasha' 4 km from the sunderban region 
of India and Bangladesh which emerged last year, is merely one of the issue 
which divide the two neighbours, others include Farakka and the sharing of 
Ganga waters, ratification and the delineation of the maritime and reverine 
boundary. In fact the Indian statement of May 19 that immediate joint survey 
was premature and not relevant. 
18. VERM A (D.C). Indo-Banga, Pak trade prospects Mainstream. 12 
(83); April, 1984; 6-9 p. 
The author suggests that the development of one subcontinent requires 
economic cooperation among the India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The need 
for intra regional cooperation based on principles of mutual benefit is being 
increasingly realised throughout the world. Trade cooperation among the 
three countries may also provide economics of scale in production. Trade also 
generate efficiencies in their own production among three countries. At the 
present age of development exports of India are characterised by diversified 
manufactured goods and the exports from Bangladesh are characterised by the 
traditional pattern. The economics of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan are 
mutually complementary. The overall picture is that all the three countries of 
the sub-continent can benefit by following a three way policy of mutual 
benefit for the economics of the three countries. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan 
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on the strict principle of quality and the long term objective of sub-continental 
self-reliance. 
19. ZAFAR (S.A) Indo-Bangladesh relations: problems and prospects. 
Pakistan Horizon. 46 (3-4); July-October, 1993; 89-103 p. 
This article discusses that the underlying political imbalance in South Asia and 
the consequent setback to the economic development of the member countries 
of SAARC largely emanate from India's coercive politico economic policies. 
The Indian attitude towards Bangladesh and other smaller neighbours stems 
from its expansionist policy and hegemonic aspirations are arrogantly 
perceived as bestowed by history. The prospects of Bangladesh finding any 
substantial relief from the aggressive Indian posture rest on India's bringing 
about a meaningful change in its perceptions and policies. Bangladesh also 
needs some reorientation of its approach. 
, , BHUTAN 
20. BHANDARI (Arvind). Indo-Bhutanese relations: three steps for new 
Delhi. Commerce. 142 (3634); February, 1981; 273-274 p. 
Bhutan constitutes a crucial link in the Sino-Indian alignment in the 
Himalayas, the kingdom has a tremendous importance for India. The problem 
arises in Indo-Bhutanese relation due to hyper sensitivity of a midget when 
India has to deal with a neighbouring giant. Mrs. Gandhi Govt, has adopted a 
firm policy towards Bhutan and make it clear that she would not tolerate 
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amihing that would adversely affect her security interests. Having done that, it 
should with in the frame work, of this understanding. Firstly, Bhutan has even, 
natural trepledation about her future after the experience of Sikkim. secondly. 
Sikkim was a protestorate of India, but lastly Indian troops could be stationed 
after Sikkim. The second step India ought to take is consistent with her 
defence interest She sould give Bhutan more freedom to have trade relation 
with other countries. At present Bhutan's trade is almost entirely with India. 
Third step that New Delhi ought to take to improve Indo-Bhutanese relations. 
21. CHOUDURY and T.K (Roy). The India-Bhutan relationship: some 
new trends. The world Today. 37 (12); December, 1981; 476-481 p. 
Bhutan and India have signed a treaty in 1949 and since then relations have 
been cordial and based on trust and economic dependence. By article II of the 
treaty Bhutan has agreed to be guided by India in her foreign relations and she 
observed it till the death of King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk (1952-72) without 
any reservation. But now Bhutan wants clear national identity and the 
. membership of the UN in 1971 has provided the opportunity for that. This 
desire is manifested in her demand to have direct communication with China 
regarding her 200 mile northern frontier and revision of the treaty with India. 
22. JAIN (B.M.). India and Bhutan: security and strategic dimensions. 
Strategic Analysis. 18(6); September, 1995; 843-852 p. 
The regional and global issues of India and Bhutan have demonstrated 
unprecedented mutual understanding and cooperation which have gone a long 
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way in solidifying their strategic ties. The triangular relationship of New Delhi 
Thimpu and Beijing forms the care of integral linkage between peace and 
development, security and stability in the region. The persisting irritants 
between Nepal and Bhutan over the refugee problem require India to adopt a 
more mature and more restrained stance to help defuse the ethnic tension 
between the two Himalayan States because of its fall out on India's long term 
security interests. The Indo-Bhutanese security and strategic relations are 
contingent on India's better appreciation of the cultural psyche of the 
Bhutanese people to help maintain their cultural identity and security. 
23. FARM AN AND- India-Bhutan friendship and Bhutan's problem of 
national integration. Strategic Analysis. 13 (12); March, 1991; 1411-
1424 p. 
This article deals with the relations between India and Bhutan along with the 
problem of national integration in Bhutan, particularly in southern border areas 
and with respect to ethnic Indians in Bhutan. Bhutan's land locked character, 
its small size and the physical similarities of its people with Nepal and China 
make the problem of national identity especially serious. Government efforts 
to promote integration have met criticism, opposition and terrorism. Anti-
national and non-national Bhutanese of Nepali origin receive support from 
Nepal. Although the Indian government remains determined to help Bhutan 
overcome the problem to avoid undermining relations between the two 
countries. 
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24. POULOSE (T.T). Bhutan's external relations and India. International 
Comparative Law Quarterly. 20 (2); April, 1971; 195-212 p. 
This article deals with Bhutan's external relation that are guided by its treaty 
of 1949 with India, where it agreed to follow the advice of the Government of 
India with regards to its relations with other countries. This treaty was an 
updated version of the 1910 treaty established by Britain. The term of the 
treaties never inferred that Bhutan was a part of India nor its protectorate, and 
Bhutan has upheld its right to maintain diplomatic relation with foreign 
powers. Bhutan would like to expand its external relations and hopes to attain 
this end by joining the United Nations. It must overcome the legal problem of 
establishing itself as a sovereign state, because under international law. when 
one state assumes control over the foreign relations of another state. 
25. YUSUF ZAI (Rahimullah). Indo-Bhutanese relations: Bhutan's 
quest for an international role. Regional Studies. 3 (1); Winter, 1984; 
11-49 p. 
Bhutan's quest for an international role was a natural corollary to its efforts to 
gain full sovereignty, a goal which can truly be attained only when the unequal 
treaty of 1949 with India is either scrapped or amended. Through this treaty. 
India inherited the dominant position which the British had come to occupy in 
Bhutan in the course of about 175 years. The treaty's vague phrasing 
subsequently gave rise to contentious interpretations, especially the 
controversial article 11 wherein Bhutan agreed to be guide by India in its 
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external affairs. The contradiction has vitiated Indo-Bhutanese relations for 
most of the past three decades. The disparity became more pronounced as 
Bhutan tried to overstretch its guided foreign policy to India's discomfort. A 
sequestered Bhutan saw its best chance of surmounting its India-imposed 
isolation and dependence b\ foreign links with the world be>ond India, to 
harmonise an inherently contradictory situation, Bhutan has determindly 
pursued a three-pronged strategy of consolidating the base correcting the 
Indian connection and seekins new friends abroad. 
., BURMA 
26. BANERJEE (Dipankar). Myanmar and security concerns. Strategic 
Analysis. 19(5); August, 1996; 691-705 p. 
The growing Chinese influence in northern Myanmar has been an object of 
attention in India, as well as the upsurge in opium production in Golden. 
Triangle comprising Myanmar Thailand and Laos with its attendant financial, 
military and social implications. Both China and Thailand have cracked down 
on her. In smuggling and this may lead to more heroin coming into India 
through the Nagaland, Manipur region. The opening of border trade by India 
with Myanmar in April 1995 and the new autonomy of six ethnic minorities in 
northern Myanmar complicate the issue of India's national security. A joint-
Myanmar initiative will have to be designed to monitor regional insurgency, 
drug trafficking and population flows while promoting economic exchange. 
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27. MISHRA (Pramod. K). India's Burma policy. Strategic Analysis 
12(10); January, 1989; 1183-1200 p. 
India and Burma's political, economic and cultural links are centuries old. The 
two nations share almost 1000 miles of common border and Burma was only 
placed under separate colonial rule in 1935. The two countries became 
sovereign states in 1948, they first enjoyed warm and cooperative relations 
largely due to the friendship of their leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru and UNU. 
Following UNU's "invitation'" to General Ne win to form a government in 
1958 and the subsequent development of one-party state in Burma, relations 
cooled significantly. Burma adopted a course of strict neutrality in the Sino-
Indian border conflicts and such difficult issues as the rights and citizenship of 
people of India origin residing in Burma and insurgencies in the frontier 
provinces of both nations came to the fore. Despite numerous diplomatic visits 
in both directions it was only on the occasion of Rajiv Gandhi's 1987 trip to 
Rangoon that some positive progress seems to have been made. In fact, no 
major bilateral problems oppose the two countries and relations may further 
improve with the potential emergence of democracy in Burma. 
28. SELTH (Andrew). Burma and the strategic competition between 
China and India. Journal of strategic studies. 19(2); June, 1996; 
213-230p. 
The study of the complex relationship between China, Burma and India 
usefully out line the new strategic environment drawing attention to the critical 
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shift in regional power relationship which has flowed from the state law and 
order restoration council's formal assumption of power in Rangoon, and 
subsequent embrace of China. The slorc turned to China in lass as an 
expanding measure to ensure immediate survival and to help restore Burma's 
diplomatic and economic standing in world affairs. In these aims, the SLORC 
is successful in using China to find a more balanced international position or 
will instead find itself being used by China is something that India the other 
countries of the region will be watching very closely. 
29. SINGH (Swaran).The sinicization of Myanmar and its implications 
for India. Issues and Studies. 33(1); January, 1997; 116-133 p. 
This article deals with the aggressive attitude of China. The China has clearly 
made it a priority to expand its access and operational reach to the pacific and 
Indian oceans while the rest of the world has been either trying to engage or 
contain China's super power ambitions. The state law and order restoration 
council of Myanmar has allowed Beijing to use this once non-aligned country 
as the PRC's most reliable ally. China's entrenchment is very aspect of 
Myanmar life and politics in the 1990's has led china-watchers to describe 
Myanmar as the PRC's most crucial potential strategic out post. Considering 
the contetious historical legacies of most of these Asian countries this has 
obvious implication for the peace and security of India as well as countries 
both in south and south east Asia. 
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, , CHINA 
30. ACHARYA (Alka). Sino-Indian relations since Pokhran II. 
Economic and Political Weekly. 34(32); June, 1999; 1397-1400p. 
India-China relations deteriorated after India's nuclear explosions. India 
expects China to be more sensitive to its security and strategic concerns. It is 
possible for the two countries to temporarily shelve prob;ems which are 
intractable and improve bilateral relations by other means. IndiaChina 
relations was never more evident than in the year since the Indian nuclear tests 
of May 10, 1998. The aftermath of Pokhran II saw a fairly drastic downward 
swing in India-China relations. India believes that China should be more 
sensitive to its security and strategic concerns. The Indians and Chinese on the 
bilateral relationship reveals that they unfailingly begin by praising the efforts 
by both sides to improve the relationship and then add that despite these 
efforts deep mutual suspicion and distrust still exists. The re-commencement 
of the formal dialogue between India and China alone will not be sufficient to 
also initiate the process of once again bringing about a cordial and friendly 
atmosphere in which to discuss other matters. The questions of weaponisation. 
force levels which could constitute a deterrent and soon, the Pakistan factor 
have become more and more complicated, India and China have to sit down 
together at the negotiating table. 
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31. AHMED (Abu Taher Salahuddin). India - China relations in the 
1990*s. Journal of contemporary Asia. 26 (1); January, 1996; 
100-115 p. 
After the 1962 war. relations between India and China remained practically 
non-existent until ties were restored in 1976 at the ambassadorial level. While 
both sides remained cautious in subsequent ministerial visits. The 1998 
marked a positive watershed when prime minister Rajiv Gandhi paid a visit to 
China to advocate India's willingness to establish bilateral trading relations 
and educational and cultural exchanges. As a consequence, a joint working 
committee was formed in order. The territorial issue which had long inhibited 
mutual rapprochement eroded following the return visits by the Chinese and 
Indian premiers Li Peng and Narshimha Rao in December 1991 and 
September 1993 respectively, as it became clear the border issues could be 
discussed without directly linking them with the over all bilateral relations. All 
the meetings between eight rounds of border talks and seven rounds of joint 
working committee meetings between China and India since 1988 have not 
resolved the territorial issue as both sides prefer the status quo. 
32. AHMED (Samina). Sino-Indian relations in a changing world. 
Regional Studies. Summer, 1993; 3-40 p. 
This article deals with the disappearance of cold war enmities and alliances 
which provides a more conducive atmosphere for Sino-Indian cooperation. 
The relative weakening of the bargaining position of the two states in a world 
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dominated militarily by a single superpower has led to the awareness that an 
improvement of bilateral relations will provide them greater leverage on the 
international stage. The reordering of the global balance of power has 
promoted Sino-Indian normalization. The lingering distrust and suspicion in 
the bilateral context are playing their own role in retarding progress towards a 
true rapprochement. The domestic considerations on both sides also have an 
impact on the future relations between the two states. The presence of pro-
Tibetan forces on Indian soil is a further source of tension. 
33. BAHL (S.K). Transnation corporations and sino-Indian economic 
competition. China report. 25(1); January - March, 1989; 11-38 p. 
The article discusses the role of transnational corporations (TNC) in the 
people's republic of China and the role of transnationals in the third world. It 
presents a situation which at once calls for greater cooperation between the 
two Asian giants India and China to evolve common strategics to maximise 
the benefits and minimise the costs involved in their joint ventures with TNCs 
and to stall any exploitation by the rich. North, However, at another level have 
to take cognizance of economic rivalries between India and China. It exposes 
the economic dimension of Sino-Indian relations. The intensity of Sino-Indian 
economic relations not only exists already but is likely to assume serious 
proportions in the years to come. 
34. BAKSHI (Z.C). Sino-Indian relations in the 1990s. USI Journal. 122 
(510); October - December, 1992; 450-455 p. 
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This article deals with the Sino-Indian relations through 1990s. It presents a 
brief historical background of their relations for over two thousand years. In 
the light of India's anti-colonial and anti-hegmonistic world view third world 
and role of non-alignment and emergence of unipolar world due to 
disintegration of the Soviet Union observes the changing Sino-Indian relations. 
It also describes the high level exchange visits of the counterparts from both 
the countries, their week trade relations and the boundarv issue that demands 
resolution as an essential pre-requisite for a complete normalisation of 
relations between India and China. 
35. BAIN (William W). Sino-Indian military Modernization: the 
potential for de^tabilization. Asian affairs an American review. 21(3); 
WinterFall, 1994;131-l47p. 
This article discusses to a certain degree the Indian and Chinese military 
modernization programs which have made significant progress in developing 
forces that are technologically modern and that are capable of serving their 
respective defense needs into the next century. Both countries are approaching 
their levels at which they can profoundly affect Asian security, because Sino-
Indian relations have been defined largely in military terms since the 1962 
Himalayan war. The substantial, military modernization is unlikely to ease 
bilateral suspicions. Although progress is in response to the uncertainty 
created by the collapse of the USSR or is a genuine effort to reconcile 
outstanding differences. 
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36. BAJPAI (Shankar). An excuse of a valley: It is the anti-India 
sentiment built into Pakistan's power structure. Out Look . 15(9); 
Mardh, 2000; 38-42 p. 
This article discusses the Indo-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan chooses war as a 
feasible means of wresting Kashmir, either directly or by securing internal 
inter\ ention at a moment favourable to it or by accelerating its other schemes 
to destabilize India. General Musharraf himself pointed out that even solving 
Kashmir wouldn't dispel hostility as it is inherent in our relationship. The 
nature of the Pakistan state will stay the same whether Kashmir is added to 
Pakistan or not, indeed, its problems in forging a nation may become harder 
with Kashmir. Pakistan's obvious purposes in keeping up its proxy war are to 
induce international intervention and to prevent India's retrieval of Kashmiri 
cooperation. In 50 years, India has come well on the way of consolidating its 
pluralism; Tashkent and Shimla gave Pakistan a peg on which to insistence on 
Kashmir talks so it could move towards letting its political opinion accept the 
inevitable but it only hotted up the issue. 
37. BANDZOPADYAYA (Jayantanuja). India-China relations: Out 
Look for the nineteen eighties. Foreign affairs reports. 28(1); January. 
1979; 1-14 p. 
India's strategic interest in China in the coming decade is of an essentially 
negative character, that of keeping China away from the border areas claimed 
by India, and of preventing China from endangering India's security in 
49 
collusion with the US and Pakistan. The India's military dependence on the 
USSR may decline perceptibly in the 1980s, a new strategic situation will arise 
which may appear to be relatively congenial in the Chinese perception. Thus it 
may be possible for India to improve relations with China without losing 
Soviet strategic support in a crisis situation. 
38. BARAL (J.K) and MOHAPATRA (J.K). Sino-Indian peace efforts: 
evolution of variables. Foreign Affairs Reports. 31(5); May, 1982; 
81-98 p. 
This article reveals the anti-China pressure groups operating in India may 
obstruct the process of normalization between India and China. Another factor 
is the perception of each other by the adversaries. India has regarded China as 
a potential great power and has not allowed its relationswith China to be 
regulated by its relations with the super powers. However, India has not 
figured independently in China's foreign policy. Normalization will be 
difficult if China does not modify its attitude towards India. 
39. BARAL (J.K), PANDA (Pramod) and MUNI (Nilanchal). Press 
and Indian-China relations. China report. 25(4); October - December, 
1989; 359-73 p. 
The press has a better chance of influencing foreign policy in democratic 
countries. The press and foreign policy is one of the least researched areas in 
international politics. The article is an attempt to contribute to a better 
understanding of this subject taking the instances from India press on the India 
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foreign policy and India-China relation. It takes into consideration the news 
coverage, feature articles, editorials and different opinions of various Indian 
news papers at different occasions particularly Rajiv's China visit in 
December 1988. The analysis of English dailies makes it that the majority of 
them supported Rajiv's visit to China while a few opposed. 
40. BANERJEE (Jyotirmoy). Moscow's strategic link with New Delhi. 
China Report. 19(1); January - February, 1983; 7-20 p. 
The Soviet leaders started a policy of cultivating India which barring a few 
years in the late 1960s. The Indo-Soviet military ties since 1960 have been the 
backbone of India defence establishment. Soviet commentaries by pass New 
Delhi disagreements with Moscow but magnify those with Beijing and 
Islamabad. Moscow frowns upon India's moves to normalize relations with 
these two neighbours as well as the US. Mrs. Gandhi remains Moscow's 
favourite Indian leader although her successful summit with R. Reagon in 
1982 made it apprehensive. USSR launched its own rapprochement efforts 
with China in recent years which in turn may make New Delhi somewhat 
uneasy. The convergence of Indo-Soviet strategic interests however remains as 
does the 1971 friendship treaty which provides India's security insurance. 
41. BASU (A.R). India's China policy in historical perspective. 
Contemporary South - East Asia. 13(1); June, 1991; 103-115 p. 
This article deals with the relationship between two of the major Asian 
powers. India and China which has been characterized bv tension since the 
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1950s. This tension erupted into conflict in 1962 over the long standing border 
dispute between them. Whilst this dispute still remained unresolved and 
therefore a continuing source of friction, the 1980s was a steadly improvement 
in the bilateral relationship, with greater cultural and trade links being forged. 
This article argues that although the border dispute will, remain largely 
unresolved and despite the fact that there will be a reinforcement of their 
natural rivalry due to a growing awareness of their relative importance in the 
region and the resultant competition for influence the recent emphasis on 
increased bilateral co-operation will continue. India's policy towards China is 
being governed by the desire to avoid damaging, external disputes because of 
continuing political instability at home. 
42. BRECHER (Michael). Non-alignment under stress: the west and the 
India-China border war. Pacific Affairs. 52(4); winter, 1979-80; 
612-630 p. 
This paper explores the impact of the India-China border war and especially, 
the role of the west on the basic principle of India's foreign policy since 
independence. The crisis and ensuing war of 1962 was a turning point, for 
non-alignment was almost toppled by India's military defeat and her dramatic 
dependence on the west. It survival was due to a rare and unintended 
complementarity of behaviour by the super powers. In particular, US caution 
during the border war and the following year about massive air support 
aborted a developing military relationship which almost certainty would have 
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crystallized into a defacto alliance. While the principle was retained, the 
activist spirit of India's foreign policy was shattered under the stress of the 
border war. 
43. BROOKMAN (F.H) and VIERLING (AJ.C). Transfer of 
knowledge and techniques: science policy between the China, India 
Indonesia. International Political Science Review. 3(3); March, 1982; 
285-293 p. 
this article deals with the science policy is a concept whose implications are 
difficult to define depeding on one's approach. In the first world, it relates to 
capital and research-intensive industries in the third world, the concept refers 
to labor intensive industries. Therefore, all the development policy, of transfer, 
is based on the linear rnqdel of capital and research-intensive industries 
towards labour industries. In other words, conceptualization fixes the 
dependence of less developed countries. But the later dismiss the academic 
and socio-cultural structures of western and economically developed countries. 
44. BUDHRAJ (Vijaysen). China as a factor in Indo-Soviet relations. 
Out Look. 34(1); April, 1980; 75-84 p. 
China would like the Indian Government to the extent of abrogating the 1971 
Indo-Soviet Treaty. China, however, persists in advancing territorial claims, 
increases its nuclear capability. These developments encourage India to remain 
circumspect with regard to China. It follows that there is an implicit 
relationship between the Sino-Soviet cold war and Sino-lndian differences on 
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the one hand and Moscow's interests in India's stabiHty economic strength and 
military capability on the other. International situation would be unadvisable 
for India to lose Soviet political and strategic support in thye hope of improved 
relations with China. 
45. CHATURVEDI (S.K). Changing global scenario: role of China as an 
intrussive power in Indo-Nepal relations. India Quarterly. 48(1-2); 
January. 1992; 75-88 p. 
The core-periphery and intrusive model has been used to explain the cobwebs 
of international relations in regional perspective. Invited by the peripheral 
actors to protect their interests in relation to the core power, the intrusive 
power is an extra regional actor having politically significant participation in 
the international relations of the regional system. In the south Asian context, 
Nepal a peripheral power, has successfully used China as an intrusive actor 
against India, the core power of the region. China extended aid, assistance and 
political support to Nepal and influenced its policies in desired directions 
during the cold war period. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet block 
in an effort to maintain her intrusive role in the region and prominent position 
in a Euro-centred world, China is emphasizing south-south and North-South 
cooperation. It has started providing more importance to India in the region 
with the motive that a close relationship between the core intrusive factors 
may lead to stability in the subcontinent. 
54 
46. CHAUDHRI (A.G). Sino-Indian border dispute. Regional studies. 
2(3); summer, 1984; 39-63 p. 
The Sino-Indian boundary dispute gained prominence in 1962 when hostilities 
between two countries resulted in a war. This border remained undemarcated 
during British and even after. The Indian always denied the existence of any 
boundary dispute where as the Chinese maintain that the boundaries had never 
been delineated, disputed still exist. The territorial claims of the two sides on 
the border dispute can be explained in the light of the legal position and 
historical usage. The actual position of the disputant on the ground is to 
determine factor of the two disputed areas, NEFA and Aksaichin. The 
solution must take into consideration the legitimate needs of the two sides, the 
Chinese after of swapping Aksaichin for McMohan line possible case for a 
solution. 
47. CHENGAPPA (B.M). India-China relations: issues and implications. 
Strategic Analysis. 16(1); April, 1993; 39-51 p. 
This article deals with the military modernization, China's relations with south 
Asian states. The boundary problem and the Chinese nuclear explosion in May 
1992 coinciding with the Indian presidents visit have all had a negative effect 
on relations with India. Only the smooth management of the boundary 
problem to be positive. The question is whether Indian diplomacy can counter 
Chinese influence in South Asia and still continue to have cordial relations 
with China. 
55 
48. CHERIAN (John). Commemorating Sino-Indian ties. Front Line. 
17(7); April, 2000; 55-56 p. 
India and China celebrate 50 years of the establishment of bilateral diplomatic 
relations. The prime minister of India and China exchanged state visit under 
the agreement, India gave up all extra-territorial rights and privileges inherited 
from the period of the British rule and recognized Tibet as a region of China. 
Prime minister Indira Gandhi has sent a strong signal to Beijing when she 
started at a press conference on January 1, 1969 that the Indian Government 
would be prepared to solve the conflicts with china through unconditional 
talks. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, as external affairs minister, visited Beijing in 1979 
and more important had discussions with the paramount leader. On India's 
request, the Chinese side gave its assent to reopening the pilgrimage route to 
Kailash and Mansarover. Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in 
1988 gave the much-needed fillip to the faltering border talks. It was the first 
visit by an Indian prime minister since Nehru's visit in 1954. Prime minister 
P.V. Narshimha Rao's visit to China in September 1993 led to the expansion of 
the CBM regime. In February 1994 the experts group meeting took place for 
the first time. But after the second round of tests, the Chinese attitude stiffened 
noticeably. 
49. CHERIAN (John). Concerns and caveats: a round of the India-China 
security dialogue held in Beijing makes; only halting progress. 
y r 
Frontline. 17(6); March, 2000; 116 p.' -\ ( 
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The Sino-Indian security dialogue held in Beijing, ended in the second week 
of March. India has been engaged in a high-level dialogue with the other 
permanent members of the united nations security council relations between 
the two countries had soured India's nuclear tests in May 1998. The letter 
written by prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to President Bill Clinton. 
Alluding to a threat perception from China and defence minister George 
Femandes characterisation of China as "potential enemy number one" 
complicated matters further. The external affairs minister that India and China 
have decided that the differences on nuclear issues should not be an 
impediment to dialogue which is the only means for their resolution. China has 
not blamed India for the recent developments involving the Karmapa Lama. A 
Chinese official said that his government was not sure about the involvement 
of either the Indian government or the central intelligence agency, but was 
sure about the culpability of the Dalai Lama in the episode. 
50. CHERIAN (John). Working together: the latest Sino-Indian joint 
working group meeting in New Delhi has reflected a positive outlook. 
Frontline. 17(10); May, 2000; p 22. 
The Sino-Indian joint working group (JWG) took place in New Delhi in the 
last week of April. This was yet another important step in the slow but steady 
process to normalise relations between the two countries. Chinese foreign 
minister Tang Jiaxuan wrote a letter to his Indian counterpart, expressing 
Beijing's appreciation for the help rendered by India in defeating a US 
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sponsored resolution that criticized China's human rights record. Other 
western countries seeking to capitalise on the so-called "human rights" issue in 
order to pressurise developing countries. China considers the border issue to 
be a complicated and difficult one, the settlement of which requires time and 
patience. Both sides differ on the line of actual control (LAC) as well as the 
exact border. However, in an important CBM, both countries agreed to resume 
senior level military contacts which were suspended after the Pokhran II 
nuclear tests. 
51. DAFTARI (Maryam). Sino-Indian relations and "encounters" 
challenges and opportunities in the 1990s. Iranian Journal of 
International Affairs. 7(1); Spring, 1995; 156-170p. 
At the beginning of the 21 '^ century, China and India will probably be part of 
the new global pecking order. The most assessment on China's future role in 
the economic. Military and political spheres are that will grow stronger and 
that is central geographic position in Asia will lead to play a significant role in 
the region. India is the largest and strongest central power in south Asia and 
has played a dominant role there, however, it is economically vulnerable and 
that makes it a weker candidate for becoming a world power in the near ftiture. 
The emergent trends in bilateral relations during the past several years are to 
the positive attitude and desire of the leaders of both countries for continuous 
dialogue for the enhancement on cooperation in the cultural, social, economic, 
political, scientific and technological fields. There are two points of 
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divergence, the boundary issue and political difference. Both sides have agreed 
not to let the boundary dispute hinder the expansion of ties in other areas. 
Once this issue is resolved, there is probably no limit to closer cooperation. 
52. DUTTA (Surjit). India's evolving relations with China. Strategic 
Analvsis. 18(4); July, 1995; 477-502 p. 
The article discusses the trends of India's evolving relations with its large 
northern neighbour, the people's Republic of China which is of considerable 
importance to the efforts to construct a peaceful and stable post-cold war. It 
throws light upon. China as a key security factor in Asia, China's interest in 
India, cooperation and confidence-building processes between India and China 
concerns also with the post-Deng future of China, growth of China and India's 
options. It concludes that both India and China have enormous interest in the 
development of their relationship for more peaceful and prosperous future 
which can only be achieved by joint efforts. 
53. DESPANDE (G.P). Looking into the next millennium: India and 
China. International studies. 30(2); April-June, 1993; 207-214 p. 
India has to device ways of ensuring that the ambition remains global and does 
not impinge too menacingly on the South Asian region and on its own view of 
a stable order in south Asia. The military relations with China are not going to 
be as central as the diplomatic and political management. It is imperative, 
however, that India solves as speedily as possible all issues which might turn 
this competitive relationship into an adversary one-as for example the issue of 
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the alignment of its border with China. China's stake in a mutually acceptable 
settlement of bilateral problems with India is quite high. The challenge before 
India is to reach an arrangement with China before the stakes cease to be high. 
54. DUTT (Gargi). India and China. International Studies. 17(3-4); 
July - December. 1978; 601-611 p. 
The major problem is the border dispute between the countries. The border 
problem is no longer just a question of Aksai China and the Mcmohan line. It 
is now far more complex and includes the strategically important Karakoran 
highway, China's position on Kashmir, its non-recognition of the accession of 
Sikkim to the Indian Union, and its support of Naga and Mizo hostiles. 
China's attempt to influence developments in south Asia and to play a role in 
the political affairs of the region militates against India's basic policy of not 
allowing any foreign interference in the sub-continent. 
55. DUTTA (Surjit). Sino-Indian relations: Prospects and trends. 
Strategic Analysis. 13(5); August, 1990; 501-510 p. 
This article states that during most of the past forty years Sino-Indian relations 
have been strained over territorial, political and security issues over the past 
two years there has been a distinct improvement in the climate. During Rajiv 
Gandhi's visit to Beijing, the two sides agreed to maintain peace and 
tranquility on the borders, expand cooperation and set up a joint working 
group at the foreign secretary level to seek a solution to the territorial problem. 
Both leaderships have thus come to understand the link between peace and 
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development and the value of cooperation in achieving key national and 
international goals. 
56. DUTTA (V.P). India and China: ^leap into the future. World Focus. 
14(11-12); November-December, 1993: 51-52 p. 
This article provides a speculative leap into the future of Indo-China relations. 
Both the countries are going through a transitional phase in the economic as 
well as political spheres and their future bilateral relations are dominantly 
determined by this. 
57. FOOT (Rosemary). Chinese-Indian relations and the process of 
building confidence: implications for the Asia-pacific. Pacific 
Review. 9(1); January, 1996; 58-76 p. 
China's traditional to security questions appears to be antithetical to the 
cooperative security approach that has been adopted by ASEAN and 
multilateral organizations such as the ASEAN regional forum. The course of 
normalizing relations with India-China has shown itself willing to explore the 
kind of confidence and security building in interests that prompted China to 
explore the worth of such measure, nevertheless cooperative security would 
have proved helpful in defusing tensions between New Delhi and Beijing as a 
result of its experience with India. There are indications that China has 
become more receptive to the use of a cooperative security framework 
elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific, most notably in dealing with the ASEAN 
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Regional forum. Its involvement in this process has increased the diplomatic 
and economic costs. 
58. GHOSH (Abhijit). Dynamic of India-China normalisation. China 
Report. 31(2); April-June, 1995; 251-270 p. 
Normalization of Sino-Indian relation earnestly began with Rajiv Gandhi's trip 
to China in December 1988. The two countries relations reached a high point 
when prime minister P.V. Narshimha Rao visited Beijing in September 1993 
and signed the line of actual control agreement. India-China relation are 
plagued with many problems like the boundary dispute, the Tibetan issue, 
China's non-recognition of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, as part of the 
Indian territory the alleged supply of Chinese arms to Pakistan and Myanmar 
and the deployment of Chinese missiles in Tibet. It is hoped that the two 
countries would make an earnest effort the resolve the ticklish border problem 
on the basis of quid pro quo. This requires continuation of bilateral 
negotiations. 
59. GOP ALAN (Sita). India's China Policy. Strategic Analysis. 14(12); 
March, 1992; 1401-1414 p. 
This article state that the border issue has often been a problem in the 
normalization of India-China relations. The crux of the analysis is India's 
response to the Chinese threat across the border under Nehru, India's decided 
to launch a diplomatic offensive and tried to delay the potential conflict. 
India's strategy was to consolidate her relationship with her Himalayan 
62 
neighbours Sikkim, Bhutan. Nepal-through a network of diplomatic security 
agreements to counter the possible Chinese aggression, besides administrative 
and policy measure. In 1990, India proposed that a settlement should not 
legitimize the gains of armed intervention and should be based on logical and 
administrative considerations. China, in 1991, proposed that the two Chinese 
and the India search for a just and reasonable solution. Though both sides 
realize the importance and urgency to resolve the border question, neither 
would like the border issue to impede the expansion of cooperation in different 
areas. This is a positive attitude reflective of the development of a mature 
relationship. 
60. GUPTA (B.S). China and Indian communism. China Quarterly. 
50(2); April-June, 1972; 272-294 p. 
The Indian communist party hailed the Chinese revolution as making event, 
but contical to regard the Soviet Union as the fountain head of doctrinal as 
well as directions. The Chinese should have realized that it is by no means 
easy to promote a Maoist movement in India. They are not likely to give up all 
attempts nor are they expected to go back to the late 1960s, but will probably 
make low-level efforts to encourage peasant-oriented militant radicalism in the 
Indian communist movement. 
61. GUPTA (Karunakar). Distorsions in the history of Sino-Indian 
frontiers. Economic and Political Weeklv. 15(30); July, 1980; 
1265-1270 p. 
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The distortion of history, suppression of facts, and withholding of official 
documents relating to the frontier from independent historians have been as 
much responsible for the aggravation of the Sino-Indian border conflict as the 
deliberate and even official incitement of nationalistic emotions in India. This 
article attempts to expose some of these official distortions to which both 
imperial considerations of the British Indian government and the nationalistic 
aspirations of the government of free India appear to have contributed. It calls 
for a close scrutiny of the role of the historical division of the external affairs 
ministry in the perpetuation and strengthening of the myths that surround the 
border dispute between India and China. 
62. HABIBULLA (E). India-China thaw: human consideration. 
Mainstream. 26(9); December, 1987; 12-14 p. 
This article discovers that since the start of India-China negotiations over the 
border dispute the human side had not been taken into considerations 
objectively. While drawing geographical lines between the two countries, the 
sector by-sector approach should make sure that no people and their territory is 
cut into two, but that the whole people with their culture move to the northern 
or southern big card outdated political thinking. 
63. HUSSAIN (T.K). Sino-Indian relations. Economic and Political 
Weekly. 6(36); September, 1971; 2017-2022 p. 
The Government finds itself in a sufficiently strong position to move away 
from the old line on China especially in matter of direct national concern. 
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India can also gain impetus in recent international dealings. The crisis in 
Pakistan provides India with an excellent opportunity to nature and scope of 
Sino-Pak friendship. India, till now, has missed the point that the collusion 
between China and Pakistan may not be total, though outwardly China might 
assure Pakistan of its support and sympathy. There are, also several stimulants 
on the Chinese side to normalize relations with India. In the 1970s china does 
not consider India a major competitor in the international field. 
64. JETLY (Nancy). Sino-Indian relations: a quest for normalisation. 
India Quarterly. 42(1); January-March, 1986; 53-63 p. 
India's great urge to come to terms with China is longer overbearing, but this 
is not to argue that Indian should drag its feet in seeking improvements of 
relations with China. The continued stalemate on the border not only serves to 
condone a military its potential border but also curbs India's diplomatic 
manoeuvrability, limiting its potential role in the region and the wider world. It 
is in India's abiding interest to have peaceful and cooperative relations with its 
powerftil neighbour. But the imperative need for spelling out clearly the 
parameters for a meaningful dialogue can not be overlooked. 
65. JETLY (Nancy). Sino-Indian relations: old legacies and new vistas. 
China Report. 30(2); April-June, 1994; 215-223 p. 
The signing of an agreement between India and China in September 1993 on 
the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the line of actual control in the 
border areas is an important landmark in the current phase of improved Sino-
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Indian relations. The agreement essentially lays down a broad frame work 
within which the border dispute can eventually be resolved in an atmosphere 
of mutual trust and greater political understanding. This thaw in Sino-Indian 
relations w ill remain largely illusory if India is not able to sort out with china 
its own vital interests and sensitivities in the region in a spirit of mutual 
confidence and accommodation-India must make a conscious effort to rise 
above the legacy of the past and chart out a new path in keeping with the 
requirements of today. 
66. JOHN (Ronald Bruce). Japan's moment in Indo- China. Asian 
Survey. 35(7); July, 1995; 668-681 p. 
This article deals with the Indo-China relation. Japanese economic interests 
are playing a growing role in South east Asia. This development is in a large 
part the result of a post world war II. The endeavors to keep Indo-China free of 
communism fostered the idea of a Japanese initiative in procuring accessible 
resources and markets in the region so as to assure reciprocal prosperity 
through trade. The escalation of US involvement in the Vietnam war from 
1965 to 1973 marked a turning point for the penetration of southeast Asia by 
Japanese capital. While most private corporation refrained from direct 
investment they offered long term credits for the purchase of Japanese goods, 
thus laying the ground work for the development of a future partnership. A 
thorny reparations demand and residual suspicion both dating from world war 
II have made Japan's Indo-Chinese partners somewhat cautious. But only 
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Cambodia, due to its unresolved internal conflict, has not fully benefited from 
an enhanced economic exchange. 
67. JOSHI (Manoj). The Sino - Indian border problem. Strategic 
Analysis. 15(7); October. 1992; 683-694 p. 
The efforts for the resolution of the Sino - Indian border problem have to be 
the fulcrum of any Sino - Indian relationship in the future. The present Indian 
negotiating position is based on mutual adjustment and mutual understanding. 
This means that India is for resolving the border problem on the basis of 
"adjustment" of the line of actual control (I^AC). It is now willing to takeup 
the delimitation of the entire Sino - Indian frontier based on the principle of 
"logistical considerations and administrative convenience" as well as 
geographical principles. China has also reiterated her call for mutual 
accommodation, meaning concession by both sides. The two sides are now 
holding negotiating positions that are workable and require requisite political 
direction in this sensitive area to begin the process of agreeing on principles. A 
sincere effort to actually work out a mutually acceptable LAC could take 
several years. The very process would help to map this region and build 
confidence as well as take a giant step in assuring peace. 
68. KARKI HUSSAIN (T). Indian relation with China. World Focus. 
14(11-12); November-December, 1993; 47-50 p. 
The article describes that the initiation of Sino - Indian detente began in right-
earnest in the last decades. The end of US-Soviet rivalry has coincided with 
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the end of the Sino - Indian cold war. This development provides India and 
China with a host of opportunities as well as challenges. India and China have 
proceeded to stabilise their bilateral relations and to engage in constructive 
diplomacy. It exposes that corresponding, to the improvement in the bilateral 
field, China's regional policy has shed off much anti Indian edge. 
69. KRANTl (Vijay). Indo - China Border Trade: trading on top of the 
World. India Today. 17 (17-24); September. 1992; 84-85 p. 
This article discusses about the 17,000 foot high Lipu Lekh Pass which was 
used by Indian and Tibetan traders. It starts from Dharchula in Pithoragarh 
district. The region is completely cut off during the long winters when 
temparature fall below zero and snow blocks drift the valley. The border 
region over the adjoining districts of Pithoragarh, Almora, Garhwal and 
Nainital has an age old tradition of trade with Tibet. The State Bank of India 
has opened a branch here and make shift customs and police posts have been 
set up for the present. The estimates of this years borders trade range between 
Rs. 20 lakh to Rs. 50 lakh. Trade is unlikely to flourish without a decent road 
and telephone links. 
70. KUMAR (Sanjay). Urea import by China and its implications for 
India. Economic and Political Weekly. 34 (27); July, 1999; 1823-
1827 p. 
India and China have been major importers of urea in the recent times. China 
has embarked on attaining self sufficiency in urea production. They consider 
68 
this strategy crucial for attaining self-sufficiency in grain production. This is 
also part of their modernisation plan of the domestic fertiliser industry. This 
article studies the Chinese policy and its implication for the policy of India on 
expanding the domestic production capacity. The paper calls for a regional 
approach to the issue of domestic production after taking a considerable view 
on the various aspects related to it. 
71. MAHAPATRA (Chintamani). Chinese navy: development and 
diplomacy. Strategic Analysis. 12(8); November, 1988; 865-878 p. 
The long standing military cooperation between China and Pakistan is a well 
known fact. As China appears desirous of playing a role in the Indian ocean 
region and beyond both Bangladesh and Pakistan may now be figuring in the 
Chinese calculations to make their contributions to the Chinese efforts. The 
Chinese naval development program is taking place in an undertaking. Naval 
build ups and modernisation has been expressed in the developing world 
regarding them, while credit must be given to China for its successful 
employment of diplomatic measures to neutralize concern, a Chinese military 
presence in the Indian ocean will pose a threat to India, both political and 
military. 
72. MALIK (Mohan J). Sino - Indian rivalry in Myanmar [Burma]: 
implications for regional security. Contemporary South East Asia. 
16(2); September, 1994; 131-156 p. 
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This article discusses the contest for regional hegemony between China and 
India, more evident than is Myanmar which occupies a critical strategic 
position between the two countries. China's in roads into Myanmar since 
1990. especially the build-up of naval facilities in the bay of Bengal and its 
possible use by the Chinese military, are from New Delhi's perspective, 
serious encroachment into India's sphere of influence Indian strategies now 
see China as constituting a threat in the east as well as in north. The growing 
military nexus between China and Myanmar has recently prompted the Indian 
government to reassess its policy towards yongon. 
73. MANSINGH (Surjit). India - China relations in the post Cold War 
era. Asian Survev. 34(3); March, 1994; 265-300 p. 
The relations between India and China improved after Rajiv Gandhi's visit to 
China in December 1988 and subsequent high level exchanges. A joint 
working group meets regularly to institute confidence building measures, 
democrate the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and eventually resolve the border 
problem. Agreement to intelligence are possible, however, if intelligence 
agencies are willing to risk prioritizing and, arguably, narrowing their focus to 
these aspects of the trade that have not yet received the attention they deserve. 
The key opportunities include defining arms trade intelligence to exclude the 
proliferation of strategic weapons or the arming of terrorist organisations, 
substituting unclassified academic analysis for current, less critical classified 
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tasks, and experimenting with market mechanism to discipline new policy 
makers task the arms transfer intelligence community. 
74. MANSINGH (Surjit) AND LEVINE (Steven I). China and India. 
moving beyond confrontation. Problem and Communism. 38(2-3); 
March-June, 1989; 30-49 p. 
Rajiv Gandhi visit to China in December 1988 represents a culmination of 
recent attempts by China and India to close the book on 30 years of hostility 
and to promote a better atmosphere for the resolution of long standing issues, 
although summit diplomacy is unlikely to bring about the dramatic changes in 
Sino-Indian relations in the near term. It will contribute to building support in 
both countries for expanded relations. It has created a regular mechanism for 
working towards the settlement of the border dispute. The general relaxation 
on international tension also is likely to assure that Sino-Indian disputes will 
be resolved peacefully. China and India will continue to shape interstate 
relations in South Asia. Thus the normalisation of Sino-Indian relations can 
only ameliorate , the long standing rivalry between these two major powers. 
75. MAXWELL (N). China and India: the un-negotiated disputes. China 
Quarterly. 47(1); July-September, 1970; 47-80 p. 
This article discusses the Sino-Indian boundary dispute accusing the other of 
refusing to submit the question of the boundaries to negotiation. In 1954 the 
same policy was applied to the Indian claim to the Aksai China territory, long 
claimed and already occupied by China. China's sustained attempts to bring 
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the dispute to negotiation were blocked by Indian refusal. The border war of 
1968 was provoked by Indian military advances into Chinese held and 
occupied territory. 
76. NANDA (K.K). Promising new turn in Sino-Indian relations. 
Defence Seminar. 3(3); January-March, 1994; 5-7 p. 
This article examines originally full text of the agreement on the "maintenance 
of peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control" signed between 
India and China on 7'*' September 1993 at Beijing during the visit of the Prime 
Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao to China. It describes it as certainly an impressive 
triumph for India diplomacy. The agreement was vital because India and 
China agreed to undertake the reduction of forces along the Line of Actual 
Control (LAC) etc. the agreement also contains provision to hasten the pace 
towards further normalisation. 
77. NORBU (Dawn). Tibet in Sino-Indian relation: the centrality of 
marginalitv. Asian Survev. 31(11); November, 1997; 1078-1095 p. 
The Tibet has not occupied a pre-eminent place in post-war Sino-Indian 
relations. An array of international factors modified bilateral relations between 
China and India, which consequentially influenced the course of Indo-Tibetan 
relations. From the Indian perspective China respected neither India's vital 
security interests in the Himalayas nor it position on the border issue. The 
gentlemen's agreement of 1984 that Indian Prime Minister Nehru thought he 
had obtained to consolidate the acquisition of Tibetan revolt was one of the 
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main causes of the 1982 Sino-Indian conflict. Tibetan remains a zero-sum 
strategic game between the two regional powers. 
78. PRAKASH (K.N). Sino-lndian ties: towards a pragmatic 
relationship. Civil Services Chronicle. 2(9); February, 1991; 24-27 p. 
The emerging Sino-Indian ties in the new global scenario the special emphasis 
is laid on Li Pengs visit to India and issues of bilateral concern. The historic 
visit of the Chinese premier Li Peng to India has succeeded to a extent in 
breaking the barriers of mutual suspicion and distruct that has plagued the 
relationship between the two Asian against relationship between China and 
India. The crucial factor for the new-world order being envisaged in the 
unipolar world. 
79. RAM (N). India and China: a successful atmosphere building visit. 
Frontline. 17(12); June, 2000; 18-24 p. 
The president K.R. Narayanan's visit to China was highly successful. It helped 
to re-create an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation and to align current 
government policy with the positive trend in India-China relations. The Indian 
president had excellent, insight-sharing meetings with the entire top level of 
China's political leadership. The meetings covered international issues. 
Controversial issues were mostly avoided in keeping with the purpose of a 
state visit marking fifty years of the diplomatic relations. President Jian, taking 
the high ground, favoured a "Strategic perspective" for the bilateral 
relationship, in the discussions on bilateral issues president Narayanan 
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concentrated on the task of giving the India-China relationship a much 
stronger economic content. It must be a matter of national political satisfaction 
that at least as far as China is concerned this non-executive president's vision 
and approach have become the Government of India's line-that at the very 
least, he has been able to help current government policy align with the trendd 
established in December 1988. 
80. RAMACHANDRAN (K.K). Sino-Indian relations: problems and 
prospects. China report. 15(1); January-February, 1979; 7-12 p. 
China has sought to improve relations with India in order to weaken Soviet 
links with her. At the same time it has attempted to strengthen it with the other 
countries on its periphery. These overtures do not provide any valid argument 
for reducing India's militarv' expenditure, even if relations between the two 
countries are normalized and the border dispute is resolved. China's 
capabilities, present and future, have to be met by an adequate response by 
India in order to ensure optimum national security. 
81. RICHART (Weixing). India's bomb and future Sino-Indian 
relations. International Quarterly. 17(1); spring, 1999; 40-68 p. 
The India's tests in May 1988 caused a major set back for the Sino-India 
relationships. This article attempts to answer why the relationship was turned 
around so quickly and what the strategic foUouts are of the Indian nuclear 
programs. Despite measurable improvements in Sino-Indian relations in recent 
years, the two nations still view each other as geostrategic rivals. The major 
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motivation for New Delhi bomb decision is that it has felt increasingly 
uncomfortable with the power between India and China, and it wants to sit as 
equal to China at the table of world power by declaring itself a nuclear 
weapons state. 
82. SABHERWAL (O.P). India and China: contrasting nuclear profiles. 
Mainstream. 34(33); July, 1996; 25-27 p. 
This article states that India and China are the only developing countries to 
have achieved comprehensive nuclear capability that covers, areas of peaceful 
application as well as weapon capability. But the balance between weapon 
capability and peaceful applications in the two countries is vastly different 
filted as it is heavily on weapons programme in the case of China and focussed 
largely on peaceful applications in India. But weaponisation have been almost 
the total for China since the start, resulting in heavy financial and political 
investment on this area of nuclear technology. This meant the build up and 
growth of a chain of them matching the most advanced in west. Bhabha 
Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Reactor Research Centre at Kalpakkam, 
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research Centre for Advanced Technology 
(CAT) at Indore for instance. 
83. SAXENA (Rashmi). Back on track: Sino-Indian ties. The week. 
182(22); May, 2000; p 37. 
The 50 anniversary of Sino-Indian diplomatic ties have more to them than 
just an exchange of warm greetings among top leaders of the two countries. 
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China apparently has also chosen to ignore defence minister George Fernandas 
enemy number one utterances. Though external affairs minister Jaswant Singh 
had to apply his healing touch, Beijing took the stand that India and Pakistan 
should resolve the Kashmir issue through bilateral dialogue, respect the LOC 
and fmd a solution in accordance with the Lahore Declaration, which is based 
on the Shimla agreement. India and China have different interpretations of the 
traditional boundary. China has also learnt to have appreciated the way India 
handled the Karmapa issue. The president Narayanan's visit to Beijing later 
this month at the invitation of president Jiang Zemin assumes great 
significance in this context. 
84. SHARMA (S.K). Three levels of analysis: a framework for Sino-
Indian relations. Asian profile. 13(1); February, 1985; 23-32 p. 
A framework is proposed to scrutinise and explain Sino-Indian relations in a 
systematic and coherent manner. It follows three levels of analysis. At the 
systematic level, foreign policy behaviour of China and India is seen as a 
reaction to certain existing realities in the present intemational system. Here 
both are likely to follow cooperation with each other for restructuring the 
present intemational system in the global context. At the nation-state level, 
where foreign policy behaviour is a reflection of internal factors, both the 
potential powers are likely to be competitive with each other in the regional 
context. At the decision-making level, where foreign policy behaviour is the 
outcome of the domestic structures in the decision-making process, the 
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Chinese leaders can change their foreign poHcy abruptly unlike their 
counterparts in India. 
85. SHRI (Prakash). India-China relations: a comparative view of the 
1950s and early 1990s. India Quarterly. 52(3); July-September, 1996; 
1-20 p. 
The relation between India and China have come full circle since 1950s. The 
two countries tried unsuccessfully to settle their conflicting territorial claim 
through negotiations and fought a non-sharp won in 1982 leading to China 
getting 3,000 squareness of Indian territory. Having host the war due to 
militarx', India has steadily built up its defence system to another Sino-India 
war. The Sino-India cooperation and trade have grown this promises to 
continue provided and India ensurence through mutual and equal security and 
confidence building resources. 
86. SINGH (Gurnam). China and the Indian ocean region. China Report. 
20(3); May-June, 1984; 15-23 p. 
Viewing the geo-strategic and political importance of the Indian ocean region 
in the future global system, China designed its strategy in such a way that it 
could serve the global goals of Chinese foreign policy notwithstanding its 
weaker naval capability. To fight the superpowers influence in the region, 
China sought to undermine the superpower's effective naval presence in the 
Indian ocean by supporting the Afro-Asian proposal seeking the total 
withdrawal of super powers are made and dismantling their bases. Chinese 
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support to Indonesia and Malaysia on the Malacca aimed at erecting barricades 
in the way of superpower presence in the region. China constructed the 
Karakoram and Kathmandu Kodari highways and pursued a policy of 
economic and military support to the states of the Indian ocean region. The 
construction of TANZAM railway in east Africa only symbolised the Chinese 
capability and earnestness. 
87. SINGH (Gurnam). China's normalization diplomacy towards India. 
China Report. 19(3); May-June, 1983; 15-22 p. 
The earlier phases of its foreign policy in which China whipped up conflict in 
South Asia. It seeks peace, stability and cooperation. The conflict with India 
and cooperation with the US seems to have proved counter productive to its 
Afro-Asian designs. The Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan conflicts have helped 
the Soviet influence in India. India has always supervised the vital interests of 
the USSR in order to check the Soviet influence in India and to reduce the 
competition with India in the third world. China favours normalization of 
relations with it as a sequel to the settlement of the boundary problem. India 
wants to exploit Chinese curiosity for normalization by seeking concessions on 
the boundary dispute. China has little to gain in territorial as well as political 
terms from the boundary settlement because it would strengthen India's power 
position in the international system. The Soviet relations to Sino-Indian 
normalization have proved that Indian calculations were not misplaced. 
•m f ' • 
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88. SINGH (Jasjit). Future of Sino-Indian relations. Strategic Analysis. 
16(12); March, 1994; 1507-1518 p. 
Sino-Indian relations have undergone a sea change during the past eight years. 
The winding down of the cold war found the two countries ready to cast off 
the shadows of past differences and misunderstandings and move towards a 
closer relationship. The strategic priority of seeking rapid and well-managed 
socio-economic development for their people by China and India defines the 
need and areas of closer cooperation between them. It is also important at the 
regional as well as global levels. The challenge for the future will be build on 
the areas of convergence of national-strategic interests, and to keep the 
divergences and their efforts within manageable dimensions, 
89. SINGH (Swaran). Sino-Indian relations. World Focus. 19(1); 
January, 1998; 18-20 p. 
China is all set to emerge as the next global power. China might become the 
first global power which will be so much less restrained by either domestic or 
international public opinion. India shares a 2000 kilometer long border with 
this, new Asian super power and this border happens to be their major dispute 
on which the two sides have fought a shooting war in 1962. Chinese describe 
as their Tibetan autonomous region which itself forms the single most 
complicated issue between these two ancient civilisations. Tibet can perhaps 
be defined as the second most critical issue that will continue to haunt the 
imaginations on both sides. The Indian leadership in fact has always been the 
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first to take initiatives starting from the early 1970s, they not only became the 
first to declare but also the first to actually resume ambassadorial level 
diplomatic relations with Beijing. Each time China responded positively but 
slowly. Sino-Indian cooperation in certain international fora has often 
frustrated the western powers from using such a linkage between nuclear 
proliferation human rights and trade. 
90. SONDHI (MX). Peace and diplomacy between India and China . 
Pacific Community. 8(1); October, 1976; 130-148 p. 
The political observers were taken by surprise in July 1976 what appeared to 
be a sudden an ambassador to paking. An examination of Indian and Chinese 
pronouncements indicates a less strained relationship between the two 
countries but there is no indication of any significant advance on the questions 
which led to hostilities in 1962 and to a bellicose statement there after. The 
diplomatic initiative of India is not so much the reestablishment of normal 
relations since formal diplomatic ties were never returned. It should rather be 
seen as the beginning of an affirmative relationship in peace of "absent-
mindedness" towards China on the diplomatic plane. In the immediate phase 
Indian diplomacy will not raise long-standing and critical issues. At this stage 
it has initiated a movement and the onus is the new rulers of China to remove 
some of their ideological stumbling blocks in the interests of a new peace 
order in Asia. 
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91. STOBDAN (P). China's foray's into Burma-implication for India. 
Strategic Analysis. 16(1); April, 1993; 21-37 p. 
Three decades of international as well as external isolationist policies have 
kept the country backward. In 1988, when the military seized power Burma's 
economy was on the brink of total collapse. The new military regime adopted 
a new strategy of complete legalization of the existing black market. The 
massive commercial deals include selling off enormous resources to 
neigbouring countries. This dramatic change coincided with China's new 
economic open door policy. In a period of half a decade China has been able to 
convert Burma into a satellite without facing much competition. This article 
aims to highlight the growing Sino-Burmese economic and military 
interactions. It explains how these developments in India's eastern 
neighbouiiiood could affect its security interests and calculations. The 
conclusion offers suggestions as options for India's long term strategic, as well 
as, economic interests. 
92. SWAMY (Subramanian). Can India catch up with China. Frontline. 
17(15); August, 2000; 48-52 p. 
This article discusses the Sino-India economic levels. There are three 
interesting questions often in discussions involving China-India comparisons. 
First, did the two countries start post-liberation economic plaiming in the 
1950s from the same set of initial conditions. Second, is there a significant gap 
in economic levels now between the two countries. Third, is this gap 
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bridgeable in the first two decades of the 21*' century. In 2000, there is a 
substantial gap between China and India, but if India were to concentrate on a 
significantly accelerated growth in agriculture, it, services and exports during 
the next two decades, the gap can be quickly bridged. India will have to make 
strenuous efforts fiscally to raise the rate of investment to reach or cross 30 
percent, as a minimum condition to start closing the China-India gap. The task 
of course is within reach and it is a target for which the people would be 
willing to make a sacrifice "catching up with China" is a worthwhile slogan 
for India's new millennium, along with a national commitment to grow at 10 
percent a year. 
93. VANDERMEY (Leo M). The India-China conflict: explaining the 
out break of war 1962. Diplomacy and State Craft. 5(1); March, 
1994:183-199 p. 
The India-China war of 1962 can be seen as a denouncement in the ever 
worsening state of the two countries relations. After a brief review of two 
major interpretations from the literature on the 1962 war, five inter related 
elements which are important in explaining the interaction process between 
India and China are discussed. The divergent view on the boundary question, 
inter-state rivalry escalation of the conflict animosity and distrust between 
leaders and differing perceptions eventually escalated to such an extent that 
the Chinese attacked India, to the great surprise of the later which had seen the 
confrontation more in terms of a diplomatic sparing match. While India had 
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not taken into account the possibility of the opponent resorting to war to 
resolve the conflict. China had kept its military options open and won. 
94. VENKATESWARAN (A.P). India-China relations: an overview. 
World Focus. 15(11-12); November-December, 1994; 50-52 p. 
The agreement signed between India and China on the maintenance of peace 
and tranquility along the line of actual control, accordingly, loses much of its 
meaning, since neither side would have a precise understanding of how it runs. 
It is also relevant to note that the understanding on maintaining peace and 
tranquility on the line of actual control was reached as early as in 1983, 
Development in China and the international acceptance of that country by the 
outside world has changed the equation distinctly in favours of China in recent 
years. Especially since China has also not accepted Sikkim's accession to 
India and condemned it as an act of "annexation" by India. It is high time that 
India-China relations are now put on an even keel for the mutual benefit of the 
two countries, avoiding recrimination on the one hand and euphoria on the 
other. 
95. WANG (Hongyn). Sino-Indian relations: present and future. Asian 
Survey. 35(6); June, 1995; 546-554 p. 
During the better half of the 1980s, Sino-Indian relations shifted from 
antagonism to dialogue. The efforts to negotiate points of contention through 
diplomatic channels result in Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 
1988. This was reciprocated by Premier Li Peng's visit to India in 1991. Prime 
83 
Minister Narsimha Rao's 1993 trip to Beijing enabled the leaders of the two 
countries to express their mutual satisfaction with the achievement reached in 
negotiations while agreeing on the need to promote the exchange of science, 
technology and trade. As Russia currently gives priority to its relationship with 
the west. India has lost its status in Russia foreign policy imperatives foreign 
New Delhi to pursue national interests, revamp strategic economic targets, and 
need just foreign policy to include reciprocal relations with China. 
96. ZHENGJIA (Ye). Lesson from the past: a review of Sino-Indian 
relations over the past 50 years. Frontline. 16(27); January, 2000; 
49-51 p. 
China and India will celebrate the golden jubilee of the establishment of 
mutual diplomatic relations. It is an opportune time to have a general review of 
Sino-Indian relations over the past half century. China and India's, as people 
in both countries used to say, represents two of the oldest civilisation and share 
similar experience in modem times. In the decade since the disintegration of 
the former Soviet Union, both China and India have been subject to mounting 
pressures from the super power left in the world. People in China and India are 
talking about the need to bring about closer of the two countries. The 
developments in the Sino-India relationship have witnessed all the ups and 
downs. Sino-India relations have thus explained through the nine different 
phases. 
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., INDONESIA 
97. ARORA (B.D.). Pakistans's role in Indian-Indonesian relations 
during the Soekamo era. International Studies. 14(2); April-June, 
1975; 219-250 p. 
Pakistan all along played a damaging role in Indian-Indonesian relations. In 
the initial stages Indonesia preferred Indian secularism and non-aligmnent to 
theocratic basis of Pakistan and its alignment policy. During 1961-1965, 
however, Pakistan developed its relations with the Communist countries, 
especially China, and thereby sought to reduce its excessive dependence on the 
west. Pakistan also became an enthusiastic supporter of Indonesia's demand 
for a second Afro-Asian conference. Simultaneously she tries to tarnish India's 
secular, non-alignment and good neighbourly image in Indonesia by April 
1964, Pakistan successfully enlisted Indonesia. 
98. JHA (Ganganath). A brief survey of India-Indonesia relation. 
Contemporary South Asia. 17(4); March, 1996; 389-405 p. 
India and Indonesia have taken important initiatives to strengthen their level of 
cooperation and partnership. Both countries support economic libralisation and 
perceive scope for expansive of bilateral trade and investment. The article 
analyses the various factors that had created misunderstanding between the 
two countries in the past and emphasises the importance of both in the present, 
finally some tentative projection for future bilateral cooperation. 
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, , IRAN 
99. ALI (Mehrunnisa). The changing pattern of India-Iran relations. 
Pakistan Horizon. 28(4); April 1975; 53-66 p. 
The India-Pakistan war of 1971 and the subsequent events have certainly 
shifted the balance of power in India's favour. Conversely, Iran's ambition to 
car\ e out an era of influence in the Gulf appears to be the outcome of the 
development of the seventies. A course of concern for India was Iran's link 
with the CENTO. India had always looked with disfavour at the CENTO. 
India welcomed aid investment from the small because of its desire to reduce 
its financial dependence on the US and the USSR. Indo-Iran relations are 
progressing, particularly in the economic field. 
100. AYOOB (Mohammed). Indo-Iranian relations: strategic, political 
and economic dimensions. India Quarterly. 33(1); January - March, 
1977; 1-18 p. 
There are points of friction, cooperation and accommodation in Indo-Iranian 
relations. The Indo-Pakistani reapprochment in 1973 led to the Indo-Iranian 
detente. The Iranian strategic dependence on the USA and the Indian links 
with the USSR in strategic matters may stand in the way in their economic 
collaboration. 
101. DEV (S.Kumar). Indo and Iranian strengthen economic relations. 
Commerce. 136(34); February, 1978; 177-78 p. 
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India and Iran have come closer in their approach to problems and more 
importantly to strengthened their relationship through increasing economic 
cooperation. The joint communique issued at the end quantum of additional 
crude oil that is likely to be imported but it has been estimated that one million 
tonnes of crude will help to generate about Rs. 100 crores the Iranian offer to 
supply additional crude on lump sum payment, the alternative being credit is 
meant to help India. 
102. SHRIYAN (Abhijit-G). Indo-Iranian trade relation. Financial 
Express. 17(13); February, 1978; 3-4 p. 
India and Iran have ver>' close trade relations. Iran is the largest crude oil 
producing country. Iran is our biggest supplier of crude oil the exercise of 
improving our exports to Iran should have received top priority. On the other 
hand our share in Iran's export has been varying anywhere between 3.8 per 
cent in 1970 and 2.3 per cent in 1975. India's exports to that country have not 
reached the level they ought to have during the export goods to Iran. Apart 
from the additional export items like sugar, tea, jute, and cotton textiles the 
performance of other items in our export efforts to Iran is far from satisfactory. 
, , ISRAEL 
103. BHANUMATHY (K.P). Reinforcing Indo-Israeli relations. 
Mainstream. 35(10); February, 1997; 35-36 p. 
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The India is important to Israel and presidentialy given iiigh importance by the 
Indian government. This article states that after the establishment of 
diplomatic relation in January 1992 a brisk and never ending is going on not 
just at the government level but also at the level of private industrialists and 
businessmen. An Indian garment manufacturer has setup units for exports to 
the U.S. and Europe of ready made Israeli garments the Indian-Israel business 
alliance formed in October 1996 to promote the business industry. 
104. GUPTA (SHEKHAR). Indo-Israel relations: g pragmatic peace. 
India Today. 17(1-8); April, 1992; 167-170 p. 
The corridors of the nondescript foreign office were buzzing with activity and 
excitement as the news of India's decision to establish full diplomatic relation 
with Israel arrived. The next made headlines for a whole day on radio 
television and in all the major newspapers. The Islamic world would with 
Pakistan if India moves closer to Israel does not carry much weight. Islamic 
countries would mutually favours Pakistan. There was talking in terms of 
fruitful relations between the two democratic in the Asian Islands. There was 
talk of factful and political cooperation in the war against terrorism and shared 
security perceptions and nuclear proliferation. The two countries are going to 
have a very interesting security dialogue and can play a major role in shaping 
the future of the (NPT) non-proliferation treaty. 
105. KUMARSWAMY (P.R). Israel-China military relations: India's red 
lines. Strategic Analvsis. 18(6); September, 1995; 781-792 p. 
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This article deals with the relation between Israel-China and India. India can 
not afford to be indifferent towards an aspect of Israeli foreign policy that has 
direct security ramification for India. Israel's military collaboration with China 
predates the establishment of formal relation in January 1992. Neither the 
Sino-Israeli ideological differences nor the Chinese exports of conventional 
and non-conventional arms to various countries in west Asia prevented either 
countn. from seeking and strengthen its military relation with China. India's 
security' and well being, should be equally possible for the policy makers in the 
south block to define and articulate a reciprocal approach towards Israel. This 
however, requires a greater understanding of Israel's seemingly contradictory 
foreign policy. 
106. KUMARSWAMY(P.R). Israeli-Pakistani normalization green light 
from India. Strategic Analysis. 21(9); December, 1997; 1355-1365 p. 
This article deals with the normalization of Israeli-Pakistani relations which 
complicated by the antagonism towards Israel as well as by accentuation of 
Islamic identity. Since the also accord, a small segment of Pakistan's elite has 
called for a re-examination of traditional policy. Normalization depends upon 
the willingness of the Pakistani government to discard rhetoric in favour of a 
more pragmatic approach. Such a turn around in diplomatic relations would 
naturally have an effect on India. One beneficial result for India would 
naturally be that it would no longer have to factor in Pakistan regarding an 
overturn to diplomatic relations with Israel. India has its own impediments to 
89 
normalizing relations with the Jewish state. Nonetheless, a change in Pakistani 
policy will benefit Indian interests in the middle-east. 
107. KUMARSWAMY (P.R). The limitations of Indo-Israeli military 
cooperation. Contemporary South-Asia. 5(1); March, 1996; 75-84p. 
This article reveals the dichotomy of the situation of India-Israeli relations. As 
representatives of a functioning democracy, India's political leaders worry 
about the vagaries of electoral arithmetic and public opinion. The serious 
security cooperation with Israel pre supposes a strong political understanding 
but it would be politically unwise for India to opt for "peripheral diplomacy" 
and forge a strong alliances with Israel. The closer relations between India and 
Israel would depend on a general and comprehensive peace in the middle east. 
108. MEHRISH (B.N). Recognition of Israel: India's attitude. Journal of 
Political Studies. 2(1); February, 1969; 56-65 p. 
This article deals with the one of the controversial questions in the conduct of 
India's foreign relations with Israel. Although India has recognized Israel, 
diplomatic relations have not established. So, there is a great misunderstanding 
in the minds of many people that India's attitude towards the state of Israel is 
not consistent with civilized behaviour and principles of international law. 
However, by recognized Israel without establishing diplomatic relations with 
her, India makes a distinction between recognition as a legal act euid the 
established of diplomatic relations as a purely political act. 
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109. NURI (Maqsudul Hasan). The Indo-Israeli nexus. Regional Studies. 
12(3); summer, 1994; 3-56 p. 
After India became independent in 1947, its relations with Israel remained 
more or less informal hardly attracting much attention of the outside world. It 
was however in early 1992 that formal relations between the two countries 
were established. This meant many faceted relations-cultural, economic, 
agricultural, scientific and in defence sectors. While the end of cold war and 
the collapse of the USSR had much to do with India's seeking out new with 
countries like Israel. Israel had its own compulsions of trade, business, a circle 
of new friends to break its isolation and to team up with other nations with a 
similar perception of Islamic ftindamentalism. While both India and Israel 
have their sealed new friendship with a number of agreement and intend to 
pursue their friendship ftirther as democracies. India's neighbours such as 
Pakistan see in this nexus a portentous development. 
110. RUBINOFF (Arthur G). Normalization of India-Israel relation: 
stillborn for forty years. Asian Survey. 35(5); May, 1995; 487-505 p. 
The India's exchange of ambassadors with Israel in 1992 completed a process 
of diplomatic normalization that was left unfinished when New Delhi 
recognized Tel Aviv in 1950. Among the factors that prevented ftill diplomatic 
ties were New Delhi traditional support of the Palestinian people sensitivity to 
the concerns of India's large Muslim Minority, apprehension that Pakistan 
would criticize any rapprochement with zoinist state, solidarity with the 
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positive's of the Soviet non-aligned blocks and increasing economic 
dependence on the Arab states. A desire to improve relations with concen 
with Islamic fundamentalism on the subcontinent were the considerations tha 
finally caused India to change its course in west Asia. 
III. SRIVASTAVA (R«1C). India-Israel relations. Indian Journal o 
Political Science. 31(3); July-September, 1970; 238-264 p. 
This article deals with the India-Israel relations as an important foreign polic 
issue which intermittently figured in the Indian parliament and the press fc 
nearly two decades. Since the early 1950s, the two countries have adopted a 
limited policy towards each other. This policy was evolved and likely 
repercussions on India's interests in the Arab world. Independence won, the 
development of India's policy towards Israel can be divided into three pheises, 
that is during 1947-48, India opposed the creation of Israel on ideological 
grounds. In the second phase, which lasted from 1948 to 1950, India 
considered long-term policy implications before according recognition to 
Israel and in the third phase, which began in the early 1950s and continues to 
date, India has successfully resisted internal and external pressures to establish 
diplomatic ties with Israel and has preferred to keep its contacts with Israel to 
the minimum. 
, , MALAYSIA 
112. SHARMA (Sheel Kant). Indo-Malaysian relations. Strategic 
Analysis. 17(1); April, 1994; 39-44 p. 
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The end of the cold war enabled India to cultivate cooperation and to promote 
solid economic ties with the Asian of which Malaysia is a member state. In 
Februar)' 1993, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defensive 
cooperation w as concluded bringing together the leaders of the two countries 
on military matters of concern. India has extended medical education to 1200 
Malaysian students. Both countries promote cultural exchange and tourism. 
India has also created a training program for technical and economic 
cooperation (ITEC) open to Malaysian candidates in such fields as business 
and science. 
, NEPAL 
113. BARAL (L.S). India and Nepal. International Studies. 17(3-4); 
July-December, 1978; 543-579 p. 
Nepal is likely to develop a co-operative relationship with India on the 
principle of co-equality, co-sharing, non-dominance and non-dictation, a 
relationship which is balanced and which is not marred by any patron-client 
relationship. This would enhance the prestige of the present royal regime in 
Nepal. On the other hand, there is a growing despondency among a significant 
number, if not a majority, of the so-called democratic-minded Nepalese people 
at the fading prospects of a revival of liberal political democracy in their 
country in view of India's stake in the continuance of the states quo. 
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114. BARAL (Lok Raj). India-Nepal relations: continuity and change. 
Asian Survey. 32(9); September, 1992; 815-829 p. 
The Indo-Nepal relations have been basically determined by geography. The 
Indian rules have taken advantage of it. Today Nepal is a democratic country, 
but the basic parameters of old British-Raj policy have been accepted as the 
guiding principles of Indo-Nepal relations. To understand this kind of 
relationship, its structure focus environment, actors and demands for revision 
must be studied. Under Nepal's democratic regime, both countries can review 
the patterns of their relations, hoping that such a review will be beneficial. 
India can take the initiative for reviewing the old treaties concluded by the 
Rajas of Nepal and the Government of India in 1950. 
115. DEO (A.R). Prospects of Indo - Nepal relations. World Focus. 
15(11-12); November-December, 1994; 35-39 p. 
Bhattarai and Koirala had given to their party, the Nepali congress, their 
unquestioned loyalty during its wildeness years while many of their colleagues 
had been weaned away to the greener pastures of the partyless panchayat. 
Many issues have been raised in the past through the media and in public 
discussions and seminars. The 1950 treaty has been in operation for 44 years 
and has presented no special problems. Nepal has derived immense benefit 
from its treaties without India having received even a measure of reciprocally, 
but shall let that pass. The right to work in Nepal is available to Indian 
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nationals under the 1950 treaty just as Nepal have a similar right to seek 
employment in India. 
116. DHARAMDASANI (M.D). Democratic experiment in Nepal: 
India's role and attitude. South Asian Studies. 9(1-2); January-July, 
26-47 p. 
India is using ideology as an objective and an instrument to promote national 
interest in Nepal. After the independence the Indian government made serious 
efforts to ensure the democratization of Nepalese politics, under the Indian 
pressure the first general election was held in Nepal in 1959. The 
parliamentary democracy due to that election was a development for the 
Indian foreign policy makers. King Mahendra feasing the rapprochement 
between his politicians and prime minister Nehru ended the democratic 
experiment. India believes that the revival of democracy in Nepal is possible if 
the country so desires. 
117. DIXIT (J.N). Give and take: if tackled with tact and intelligence, 
Indo-Nepal friendship can become fiilling and productive. Hindustan 
Times. 76(226); August, 2000; 11 p. 
This article analyses the prospects of prime minister G.P. Koirala's visit to 
Delhi, as India-Nepal relations seem to be in the doldrums with undercurrents 
of anxieties and suspicions. It is curious irony that Indo-Nepal interactions 
have always been animated by a deep responsiveness in India towards the well 
being of the people of Nepal. India supported the revival of democracy in 
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Nepal in the early nineties, but the successive elected governments of Nepal 
have had problematic relations with India. Though the agreements between the 
Governments of free India and Nepal have been beneficial to the people Nepal, 
it has to be acknowledged that the Nepalese feel that the 1950 Indo-Nepalese 
agreement somehow militates against their national identity and freedom of 
options. The cooperation in utilising river water resource shared by India and 
Nepal will benefit both countries. The agreements signed the Tankpur hydro 
electric project and the Mahakali Project still remain on Koirala's visit to New 
Delhi has brought the discussions to the highest political level. 
118. KHADKA (Narayan). The crisis in Nepal-India relations. Journal of 
South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. 15(1); February, 1991; 
54-92p. 
Since the expiration of the trade and transit between Nepal and India, a crisis 
has occurred stemming from the failure to continue the treaties. Numerous 
complex factors such as security issues, the domestic and international 
environment, and differences in perception and values between the two 
governments are the underlying sources of the conflict. The crisis has 
important economic, environment and political implications for Nepal as well 
as adverse consequences for regional stability. India and Nepal should strive 
for mutual understanding and accommodation to harmonize their interests in 
preserving independence and security. 
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119. LABH (Kapileshwar).India and Nepal's zone of peace proposal. 
Foreign Affairs Reports. 27(10); October, 1978; 171-183 p. 
India has claimed legitimacy that the Nepali zone of peace proposal was 
vague. Apart from stressing the urgency of peace for Nepal, the Nepali 
authorities never did elaborate the concept of their zone of peace proposal. As 
a result the proposal was interpreted differently by different sections of the 
Nepali press. Nepal may have deliberately kept its proposition vague so as not 
to be opposed by any country. However, the Nepali proposal appears to be 
primarily directed at India. 
120. PRAM AN AND. The Indian community in Nepal and the Nepalese 
community in India: the problems of national integration. Asian 
Survey. 26(9); September, 1986; 1005-1019 p. 
This article deals with the people of Nepalese origin living in India, who are 
faced number of problems. Since India is an open society, the Indian 
government can not dismiss any community's problem for long and this holds 
true for the problems of the Nepalese community in India. The best solution to 
these problems consist of face-to-face dialogue between the governmental 
leaders of these two countries without any loss of time. Apart from solving the 
day-to-day problems of migration and emigration, it would also ensure greater 
cooperation between these two countries in the context of the movement 
toward south Asian regional cooperation. 
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121. RAMAKANT and DHARAMDASANI (M.D). India's attitude 
towards Nepal. Punjab Journal of Politics. 29 (9); September, 1986; 
117-119p. 
India needs Nepal as a dependable neighbour for its defence and security in 
the Himalayan region. A new pattern of association based on solving the 
problems pertaining to the two countries on a bilateral basis is developing. 
India's approach towards Nepal should be based on a stable, reliable and 
lasting friendship with Nepal rather than one displaying immediate results for 
domestic approval. 
122. RAN A (Pashupati Shum Shere J.B). India and Nepal: the political 
economy of a relationship. Asian Survey. 11(7); July, 1971; 
645-660 p. 
This article deals with the balance of power between north and south and the 
increasing degree of economic dependence on India have determined Nepal's 
relationship with India. Between 1947 and 1954 Nepal had to accept India's 
dominance in the geopolitical scales and economic relationship. However, 
during the second phase from 1954 until 1963, After the 1962 India-China 
war, India accepted the changed balance of power and took a lowkey approach 
towards Nepal. However Nepal failed to use this opportunity to work-out 
lasting means of diminishing her economic dependence on India. So, when in 
the late sixties India's economic and defence interests created a hardline 
approach to Nepal. 
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123. SAHAY (Anand K). No option but friendship: India and Nepal 
should not shy away from strengthening ties with each other. 
Hindustan Times. 76(210); July, 2000; p 13. 
This article reveals that the Kathmandu and New Delhi should be drifting apart 
can only be a mystery. It is hard to think of any nvo countries being better 
place than India and Nepal to enjoy an excellent mutually satisfying and 
mutually nourishing relationship. The case of the hijack of IC-814 last 
December where new Delhi sought Kathmandu*s permission to station its own 
security experts to screen passengers boarding Indian planes at Tribhuvan 
international airport. Nepal refused permission on the ground that its 
sovereignty would be compromised. Another time-bomb in India-Nepal 
relations ticks away in the shape of the Kalapani border dispute which has a 
third party dimension in the form of China. For the first time, Kathmandu 
openly questioned the traditionally accepted geographical positioning of the 
source of the river kali to the west of which lies in India. This implied moving 
away the ITBP border post in the area. Kathmandu has desired a review of the 
treaty. Any dilution of it can only bring acute disadvantage to Nepal. 
124. SHAKOOR (Farzana). Indo - Nepal dispute. Pakistan Horizon. 
42(3-4); October, 1989; 68-80 p. 
Nepal is a land locked state. The two treaties of transit and trade in agreement 
with India expired on 23 March, 1989. India refused to renew these treaties, 
contending, that they should be merged. From Kathmandu's perspective, trade 
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and transit are separate issues, and transit through the territory of littoral state 
is the right of every land locked country. In order to make Nepal comply with 
its terms India ordered an economic blockade, closing thirteen out of fifteen 
transit points meant for trade between the two countries. As a consequence, 
not only did India-Nepal trade come to a halt, but there has also been a scarcity 
of essential commodities in Nepal. The trade dispute is not merely economic, 
it is a tussle between a small state determined to preserve its sovereignty and a 
big neighbour bent upon curbing it. Not only has India restricted Nepal's role 
in its foreign policy matters but it has also shown reluctance in accepting 
Nepal's freedom in its internal affairs. 
125. SUBEDI (Surya P). India-Nepal security relations and the 1950 
treaty: time for new perspectives. Asian Survey. 34(3); March, 1994; 
273-284 p. 
This article discusses the wedge between China and India, Nepal has tried to 
maintain a stance of political neutrality in its foreign relations. Its attempt to 
pursue an independent and neutral policy has often come under severe scrutiny 
from India, which regards it as part of a broader Indian security frame work 
envisaged under the peace and friendship treaty of 1950 concluded between 
the two countries. This treaty deals with several matters including certain 
questions of defence and the treatment of each other's nationals. In view of the 
treaty's provisions, India claims a "special relationship" with Nepal. The 
Indian government seems to believe that Nepal's attempts to pursue a totally 
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independent and neutral policy run counter to the 1950 treaty and undermine 
this "special relationship". The time had come for both countries to take a 
careful look at the provisions of the 1950 treaty and revise them in the light of 
changes that have taken place in the last four decades. 
126. THAPLIYAL (Sangeeta). Changing trends in India-Nepal relations. 
• Strategic Analysis. 21(9); December, 1997; 1303-1316 p. 
This article deals with the India - Nepal relations. The geographical and 
socio-cultural identities have strongly influenced India-Nepal relations. The 
geographical strategic of Nepal is equally important for it lies between China 
and India. The great dependence on India in security matters has long caused 
fears of many Nepalese. The politics of the cold war had important 
repercussions on bilateral relations. Nepal attempted to take advantage of 
Sino-Indian differences in order to reap benefit from global and regional altars. 
The multi-party democracy in Nepal has infused a new set of priorities in 
relations with India that places emphasis on trade and economics. Consistency 
in foreign policy is contingent on domestic stability. Nepal's domestic 
instability will continue to weaken recent transformations. 
127. THAPLIYAL (Sangeeta). Nepal in India's security parameters. 
Strategic Analysis. 18(9); December, 1995; 1193-1206 p. 
This article deals with the geostrategic location of Nepal between India and 
China, its mountainous passes from the north and open border in the south 
which provides India's heart land accessive to any hostile power, maker Nepal 
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important for India's security. To consolidate its security interests India, 
signed with Nepal the tripartite agreement on Gurkha Recruitment (1947), the 
treaty of peace and friendship (1950), the arms assistance agreement (1947). 
Other agreements, concerning the Indiiin military mission (1952). Indian 
military liason group (1962), were latter with drawn. The improvement in 
Sino-Indian relations does not alter the India-Nepal strategic relations because 
of Nepal's emergence as a heaven criminals and terrorists from India, the 
Pakistan inter-service intelligence aiding and abetting terrorists and muslim 
fundamentalist organization against India. 
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128. AHMAD (Naveed). Recent developemnt in Indo-Pakistan relations. 
Pakistan Horizon. 32(2); June, 1982; 71-95 p. 
The strategic and political changes bro,ught about in the region by the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan and Pakistan's subsequent acceptance of the 
American dollars 3.2 billion military' sales and economic aid package added a 
new dimension to the already strained relation between India and Pakistan. To 
assure India of its good will Pakistan offered India a non-war pact. Pakistan 
had gained a definite diplomatic advantage through its peace initiative, the 
Indian Government was in no position to reject the offer in an off hand 
manner. Negotiations began between the two countries and the situation 
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seemed encouraging when the Indian Government suddenly took offence over 
the Pakistan delegate's statement reiterating Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. 
129. AHMAR (Moonis). Security perceptions in the Indo-Pakistan 
relationship. Pakistan Horizon. 37(1); January, 1984; 100-119 p. 
India and Pakistan form the core of the south Asian security system and any 
adverse development in their relations inevitably affects the geo-political and 
security environment of the entire region. India-Pakistan relations since the 
time of the partition are marred with historical animosities, mutual suspicion, 
arms build up and political tension. The security relations between India and 
Pakistan are to be studies from historical, religious, military and political 
aspects. A sense of insecurity prevails among the peoples of both countries 
notwithstanding the deepening socio-economic problems, mismanaged socio-
economic and political institutions, ignorance, economic backwardness and a 
low level of political consciousness. A conducive security perception between 
India and Pakistan demands their convergence on external security threats and 
internal political disputes. 
130. AHMED (Mutahir). Confidence-building measure between Pakistan 
and India: an agreement for change. Contemporary South Asia. 7(2); 
March, 1998; 137-145 p. 
The India and Pakistan remain locked in traditional cold war concepts of 
security and development despite being ranked at 135 and 134, respectively, 
out of the 173 countries listed in the UN. India and Pakistan continue to directs 
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their resources towards non-developmental expenditures. In this scenario, the 
implementation of confidence-building measures is extremely necessary for 
the development of these two states and for South Asia as a whole. This paper 
traces the problems faced by the people of India and Pakistan identifying and 
examining areas of conflict such as Kashmir, nuclear weapons and religious 
extremism. An attempt has been made to suggest what measure should taken 
in order to defuse tension between the two states. In this regard, economic 
confidence-building measures have the greatest potential including the 
granting of status to each other. In order to achieve these goals, which 
continues to perpetuate a highly negative image of each country to the other is 
necessary, as is the support of the people of India and Pakistan for a range of 
confidence-building measures. 
131. AYOOB (M). India and Pakistan: prospects for detente. Pacific 
Community. 8(1); October, 1976; 149-169 p. 
There is some evidence that the Pakistani leadership has taken a pragmatic 
view of the post-1971 power structure in the subcontinent and is willing to 
reconcile itself to the existing power relations. But there is also contrary 
evidence that at least in some sections of the Pakistan elite-intellectual, 
political and military the aspiration for power parity vis-a-vis India has not 
completely dis-appeared. The current power equilibrium the domestic 
compulsion of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies and the limited 
capabilities of balance between India and Pakistan, the prospects for and Indo-
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Pakistani detente coming out of the debris of the 1971 conflict are not all that 
bleak. 
132. BAHADUR (Kalim). India and Pakistan. International Studies. 
17(3-4); July-December, 1978; 517-527 p. 
This article discusses with the re-emergence of the military-bureaucratic 
establishment in the decision-making process in Pakistan. The external powers 
also effect the politics of the sub-continent. The theory of diminishing US. 
Interest in the region does not bear security. The USSR, for its part, does not 
have any interest in tension or instability in the area. Recently, the Chinese 
have moved toweirds relaxed relations with India. A major irritant in Indo-
Pakistan relations remains Kashmir. The construction of the Karakoram high 
way by Pakistan with Chinese help and the purchase of Jaguar Fighter-
Bombers by India are new irritants in Indo-Pakistani relations. However, it is a 
good sign that the excitement created by these events in subdued on both side. 
133. BAHADUR (Kalim). India - Pakistan relations-Some hopeful signs. 
World Focus. 18(2); February, 1997; 15-17 p. 
The most interesting feature of the recent elections in Pakistan was the public 
stand on India-Pakistan relations. Nawaz Sharif declared his intension to 
initiate dialogue with India to resolve all outstanding problems. The post-cold 
war world and the emergence of the new world orders has not brought much 
change in tensions in the sub-continent. Pakistan had the restoration of 
democracy a few years ago. The long military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq as 
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a consequence of his policy of Islamisation and intervention in Afghanistan 
has left a legacy of sectarian and ethnic strife, arms proliferation among the 
numerous militant groups, the drug mafia and consequent violence and 
mayhem. Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral has given a new 
direction to Indian approach to Pakistan. He wants India to ignore the 
pinpricks and provocations and to concentrate on the positive developments. If 
Mian Nawaz Sharif sticks to his pre-poll declarations he will find in India a 
responsive partner. 
134. BANERJEE (Jyotirmoy). Hot and cold diplomacy in Indo-Pakistan 
relations. Asian Survev. 23(3); March, 1983; 280-301 p. 
When Mrs. Indira Gandhi returned to power in New Delhi in early 1980 a 
game of hot and cold diplomacy accelerated between the two South Asian 
leaders. Islamabad has been projecting an image of being a modest neighbour 
of India which is preoccupied with the Soviet Military presence in 
Afghanistan. In diplomatic move it has repeatedly offered India a no-war pact 
while successfully soliciting massive US military aid. Indo-Pakistan relations 
reached a new low in February 1982 over Kashmir. Mrs. Gandhi successfully 
summited in Riyadh and Washington thereby softening up Pakistan two 
important friends. India ftirther proposed a friendship treaty. Top level talks 
and public relations gestures notwithstanding, the historic virtual mistrust lurks 
beneath the surface, as in the need for a new pact despite the 1972 Shimla 
Agreement. 
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135. BARAL (J.K). Indo-Pak diplomacy since 1981: motivation, 
strategies and prospects. Foreign Repons. 35(4-5); April-March. 
1986; 29-47 p. 
Pakistan has sent several peace proposals to India, nor war pacts, ration 
formula, and South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone. It may be pertinent to 
refer to Zia's advice to New Delhi to maintain a low profit for the sake of 
peace in the sub-continent. It is not precisely clear what Gen. Zia means by 
lowkey, what he expects India to do when he impliedly advised Mrs. Gandhi 
to maintain 'lowkey'. The dual between Pakistan's proposal of no war pact 
and India's proposal of treaty of peace and fi-iendship is really a game of one-
up manship between these two countries. Pakistan wants a no war pact with 
India without much improvement in social by both countries that neither 
would go to war would lead to improvement in over all relations between 
them. 
136. BHASKAR (Uday). Impact of N-doctrine : on the Pakistani 
response. Hindustan Times. 75(259); September, 1999; pl3. 
This article deals with the India's nuclear doctrine and the responses which 
have been predicted. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine (IND) may be interpreted 
essentially as a catalyst for discussion at three levels-domestic, regional and 
global and in a temporal sense, it brings to a logical conclusion the May 1998 
nuclear test. Significantly , Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad lent 
support to this thesis the IND was a means by which India was trying to 
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establish its "total militan hegemony in South Asia and beyond". Non of the 
Pakistani comments seemed to acknowledge the Indian commitment to NFU 
no -first-use. India will be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond 
with punitive relations should deterrence fail. The challenge for the new 
government will to pursue nuclear reconciliation with the global community, 
and nuclear transparency and related CBMS at the regional level, even while 
persuading the domestic policy about the dialectical tension between 
deterrence and disarmament. 
137. AHMAR (Moonis). The applicability of the Helsinki model for the 
task of confidence-building and conflict resolution in the Indo-
Pakistan sub-continent. Contemporary South Asia. 8(2); June, 1980; 
137-145 p. 
The signing of the Helsinki accords by 35 countries of Europe, the USSR and 
North America on 1 August 1975 not only consolidated the process of 
confidence-building at military and non-military levels among neutral, NATO 
and Warsaw pact member states but also underlined the possibility of the 
application of such a process in other conflict and crisis-ridden parts of the 
world, particularly in third world countries. One such area where scope for 
applying the Helsinki model was and is being discussed by some circles its 
South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan. Given their deep rooted animosity 
on the Kashmir dispute and the implications of Islamabad-New Delhi cold war 
on South Asian regional cooperation it is correct to state that the road to the 
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launching of the Helsinki process in South Asia passes through New Delhi and 
Islamabad. India and Pakistan have already applied some of the conceptual 
tools present in the Helsinki final act, but their inability to break the vicious 
cycle of confrontation is a major impediment for their conflict and tension free 
ties. Therefore, the application of Helsinki model in the Indo-Pakistani context 
is a long term possibility. 
138. BHOGAL (Parminder S). Pakistan's India policy-shift from Zia to 
Benazir. Indian Quarterly. 45(1); January-March, 1990; 35-45 p. 
The Pakistan's foreign policy mainly revolves around its India policy, the 
reason being the historical background of Indo-Pak relations. However, with 
the change of leadership in Pakistan, some changes were brought in the 
countries policy and also meddled in India's internal ethnic problems. Even in 
SAARC. Zia maintained hostile postures. Besides another controversial issue 
of Siachen Glacier emerged during his era. After Zia's death Benazir came to 
power and established a democratic form of government. Although early 
month of Benazir's rule were encouraging and there has been a shift from 
Zia's beaten track, yet remains to be seen whether there would be an actual 
improvement in Indo-Pak relations in the long run or not. 
139. BOSE (Pradip). Indo-Pakistan relations: and evaluation. Jonata. 
39(5); April, 1984; p 8. 
The article describes the Pakistan's steady drift toward the US which 
ultimately resulted in the US offer of $ 3.2 billion military' and economic aid to 
109 
Pakistan. Later on the pentagon developed the concept of the rapid deployment 
forces to be used in West Asia and the Gulf region in case of need, and in 
which Pakistan is supposed to be involved also. Towards the development of 
Pakistan's new tie-up with the US, both the Soviet Union and India have made 
there own contribution while discussing the present difficulties in Indo-
Pakistan relation but also how to over come them. 
140. BURROWS (William E) and WINDERM (Robert). India and 
Pakistan: our God can uela Your God. India Today. 19(1-8); 
February, 1994; p 28. 
The article focuses on the Indians nuclear and missile program, which the 
author assort is more secretive than Pakistan's. India and Pakistan's race to 
arm with nuclear weapons encompasses all aspect of proliferation. This article 
discusses the cold war of India and Pakistan. It mainly focuses on India's 
nuclear program, India's relation with other countries and India's nuclear 
cooperation agreement with developing countries in 1951. Pakistan made 
relatively modest but efficient program in order to store off the India's 
approach. 
141. CHIBBER (M.L). Kargil Battle and India-Pakistan reconciliation. 
Nation and the World. 9(202); March, 2000; 44-46 p. 
The Kargil battle indicates that there is a need for India to take a good look at 
its strategy and tactics for persuading Pakistan to live in peace. Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif and even his predecessor Benazir Bhutto also appeared to have 
no 
realised that reconciliation was the only way to convert Kashmir into a bridge 
instead of a battle ground between the two countries. India is about eight times 
larger than Pakistan in size and population and has seven times larger 
economy. The Kashmir problem is a symptom of the great tragedy inflicted on 
the Muslims of the sub-continent by partition, they have been fragmented into 
three nation states. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's bus ride to Lahore 
was a wise and pragmatic message to the people of the two countries-that 
reconciliation must be their strategic goal. India as bigger country, has to be 
patient, sincere, loving but firm in promoting good will among peoples. 
142. CHOPRA (Surendra). Indo-Pakistan relations: a study of new 
challenges and opportunities. Punjab Journal of Politics. 4(1), 
January-June, 1980; 193-237 p. 
Indo-Pakistan relations which had been marked by conflict and discord, 
mutual distrust and suspicion which entered a new phase after the Shimla 
Agreement thereby reducing perceptual distance. The democratic regime in 
Pakistan favoured normalisation and President Bhutto supported peace and 
bilateralism with India. However, the opportunities offered by the accord 
could bot be grasped properly because of India's counter productive 
intransigence on the question of overflights resumption of conmiunication, 
transportation and trade. India's nuclear explosion at Pokhran in May 1974 
impeded the process of normalisation. However, the caution exercised by both 
the governments in making adverse comments against each other are 
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indicative of the end of hight tension politics. The much talked of bilateralism 
or beneficial bilatralism has yet to take roots. 
143. DESHPANDE (Nirmala). Foresting Indo-Pak Amity: WTPSA's New 
Strategy after success of Pakistan Women's mission. Mainstream. 
36(24); June, 2000; 3-4 p. 
This article discusses the recently concluded visit of the all-women delegation 
from Pakistan led by activist Asma Jehangir found a responding echo back 
home country to the perception that the peace mission was an initiative with 
no teeth. At the Wagha border Asma Jehangir ruled out third party 
intervention. While propagating the concept of friendly border, she conceded 
that there are "miles to go" before making the peace-dream between the two 
countries a reality. Contrary to the existing attitude whereby the WIPSA peace 
initiative was being scoffed at particularly because women were at its helm, on 
arrived in Pakistan the delegation was received by hundred of people which 
caused a near stampede. It was felt that initiative must shrug itself from 
political subservience and come out on its own "having fested the waters at the 
people's level the next step is to hammer the need for governments to 
subscribe to the will of the people rather than draft Indo-Pakistan relationship 
policies in esotric isolation". 
144. DIXIT (Aabha). India-Pakistan: are commonly accepted confidence-
building structures relevant. Securitv Dialogue. 26(2); June, 1995; 
191-203 p. 
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This article deals with the psychological condition that afflicts elites in India 
and Pakistan, leading to an almost instantaneous rejection of the other side's 
peace proposals. The bilateral CBMS in South Asia are very different from the 
European experiences, in South Asia CBMS tend to search for common 
ground at a political level rather than building confidence and trust through 
incremental ideas of transparency and varification. There is a need to develop 
for these two countries customised CBMS which can take into consideration 
the historical psychology and civilization issues. 
145. DIXIT (Aabha). Indo-Pak relations: From bad to worse. World 
Focus. 15(11-12); November-December, 1994; 23-25 p. 
The return to power of Benazir Bhutto, in late 1993, portended both hope and 
despair for the general state of India-Pak relations. It was generally felt that, 
while Benazir would be expected to return to rhetoric on Kashmir, she would 
continue to keep channels of communication open with New Delhi. The high 
profile diplomatic campaign in Africa and among Arab countries was carefully 
factored around Islam and human rights abuses of Kashmiri muslims. 
Internationalization of Kasmir, through her travels to different countries and at 
international for a, the Kashmir issue was projected as the centre-piece of her 
governments priorities. The kashmir issue was put differently to different 
audiences. In Pakistan the issue of Kashmir has overshadowed all other 
problems that exist in their bilateral relation with India. The elimination of 
poverty and liberation of kashmir are the two wars intend to win. 
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146. FISHER (Ronald J). A third party consultation workshop on the 
India Pakistan conflict. Journal of social psychology. 112(2); 
December, 1980; 191-206 p. 
A problem solving workshop on the India-Pakistan conflict was designed and 
evaluated with the use of a model of third party consultation intended for the 
study and resolution of social conflict. Six Pakistan and Indian nationals 
participated in a series of separate and joint discussions focussing on the 
present relationship, the national images, the possible ideal relationship, and 
the major problems and potential solutions to the conflict. The results indicate 
that the model was successfully operationalized and that the workshop has 
beneficial effects on the attitude of the participants. The model is 
recommended as a useful component in the developing social technology of 
international conflict resolution. 
147. GANGULI (Amulya). Insaniyat vs insanity: India's need to show 
restraint is all the greater because "mad mullah's" seem to be guiding 
Pakistani policy. Hindustan Times. 76(231); August, 2000; p 13. 
This article deals with the assertion relating to the holding of talks with 
Kashmiri militants within the bounds of humanity and not the constitution was 
one of the most remarkable declarations made by an India leader in recent 
times. The prime minister is evidently far sure of himself at present than at the 
time when he hesitantly told a television team that he will look after the 
finance portfolio only to appoint someone not of his choice later. As Nawaz 
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Sharif said, he was not awarded at that time of the kargil intrusion. Had he 
been, he said he would have stooped Mr. Vajpayee's visit. The truth will 
probably never be known the fact remains that mutual relations have shown 
faint signs of improvement only under civilian rule in Pakistan. As India is 
acquiring the status of a natural contender for a permanent membership of the 
UN security council, Pakistan regression into medieval religious extremism 
poses a paradox for this country. 
148. GANGULY (Sumit) and BAJPAI (Kanti). India and the crisis in 
Kashmir. Asian Survey. 34(5); May, 1994; 401-416 p. 
The Indian-Pakistani contest over Kashmir has been revived since the late 
1980s. For the countries, the conflict over Kashmir is less a contest over 
strategic ground or resources as over competing visions of nationalism and 
state building. The combination of reform and negotiated options is the most 
tenable with reform more plausible than bilateral negotiations. The reform of 
Kashmir's administration and politics offers the most feasible program. A 
better parliamentary force under tighter control of civil administration and 
working within the law, the institution of regular and honest electoral politics 
and a decentralization of authority are indispensable elements for a durable 
solution to emerge. 
149. GHOSH (Parkha S). Indo-Pak relations: portents and uncertainties. 
Mainstream. 21(24); March, 1983; 13-14 p. 
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The recent trends for peace cooperation between India and Pakistan are rooted 
in several major changes in the political-strategic-economic ecology of the 
global system as well as the south Asian sub-system. On the domestic political 
front, the ruling cities of both India and Pakistan are becoming aware of the 
growing irrelevance of the Pakistan factor and the India factor in their 
respective politics. The economic consideration must have also contributed to 
the peace efforts. The deep rooted attitudinal obstacles that marred Indo-Pak 
relations in the past and which are dormant now may revive any time, pushing 
the relations back to square one. The possibility of their taking a bold joint 
initiative to turn a new leaf in their strategic relationship regardless of the 
wished and preferences of the super power appears to be remote. 
150. GILES (Gregory F) and DOYLE (James E). Indian and Pakistani 
views on nuclearance. Comparative Strategy. 15(2); April-June, 1996; 
135-159p. 
This article deals with the nuclear issues while officials in India and Pakistan 
have been virtually silent on the issue of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, a 
small number of non-official strategists in both countries are moving to fill the 
avoid. They describe the current low-level nuclear stand off as "recessed 
deterrence" nuclear weapons advocates within this group have voiced their 
dissatisfaction with the status qua, ostensibly because nuclear ambiguity 
undermines stability. This has led them to promote the concept of "minimum-
deterrence" described essentially as a scaled-down version of the superpower 
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assured destruction doctrine. The strategists that favour nuclear diplovment 
ha\e high confidence that India and Pakistan would be responsible nuclear 
power. 
151. GUPTA (S). Pakistan's domestic crisis and foreign policy-problem of 
identity and relations with India. South Asian Studies. 7(1); January, 
1972; 114-126 p. 
This article discusses that there has been a clear inter-relation between the 
internal developments in Pakistan and the evolution of its foreign policy. The 
military alliance with the United States of America strengthen the position of 
the armed forces as a factor in Pakistani politics and authoritarian structure on 
a highly complex society the problems of which would have been but solved 
through democratic ways. The conflict with India severely strained the concept 
of a single Pakistani nation, since much of Pakistani unity depended on the 
acceptance of the fact a common sub-continental civilization. It is difficult to 
establish a direct cause and effect relationship between internal and external 
policies of Pakistan. 
152. HUSSAIN (Akmal). Indo - Pakistan mutual threat perception. 
Asian Studies. 9 (2); May, 1987; 23-37 p. 
The historical rivalary between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim 
League in British India has continued in the bilateral relations of India and 
Pakistan. The conflicting threat perception emanating from each either has 
brought them closer to their respective super power ally. India's status as a 
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regional power since 1972 has been challenges by Pakistan through her search 
for nuclear parity. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 has added 
new complexities in Indo-Pakistan relations. India was afraid that this would 
strengthen Pakistan's bargaining power. Her concern was reflected in her 
search for new arms mainly from the USSR. This conflicting threat perception 
can not create the required environment of peace for SAARC. 
153. JHA (D C). Roots of Indo-Pakistani discord. Journal of Political 
Science. 32(1); January-March, 1971; 14-31 p. 
This article discusses that normalization in Indo-Pakistani relations and 
solution of various Indo-Pakistani problems, including that of Jammu and 
Kashmir, would have been less difficult but for the deep-laid suspicion and 
animosity continuing from the pre-partition days and the clash of national 
interests and activities. The ideology image and power between India and 
Pakistan, to which may be added the difficulty presented by the creation of the 
two wings to Pakistan. It is the above discussed basic factors which have led 
the external forces to operate against healthy Indo-Pakistani relations and have 
propelled the different pressure groups in the two countries to work against 
them. 
154. JHA (D.C). Foreign policies of India and Pakistan: Kashmir as a 
factor. South Asian Studies. 4(2); July, 1969; 160-173 p. 
This article deals with the issue of Kashmir between India-Pakistan, Kashmir 
has remained a major Indo-Pakistan irritant ever since 1947. Consequently, 
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their policy toward each other and the state of Indo-Pakistan relations the 
betterment or the deterioration in their relations have mostly been determined 
by their policies and attitudes toward Kashmir. Moreover, their policies 
towards other states of the world greatly reflect their involvement in Kashmir. 
At the same time, it is also true that Kashmir is only a very important factor 
and not the sole or even the all important factor in determining their policies. 
155. KHAN (Rashid Ahmad). Indo-Pakistan trade: prospects and 
constraints. Regional Studies. 13(1); winter, 1994-95; 41-57 p. 
There is a growing realization both in Pakistan and India that the two countries 
can greatly benefit from bilateral trade mutual co-operation in industrial, 
agricultural and other related areas. A survey of the last decade shows that 
Pak-India trade has considerably expanded though unofficially. There is also a 
perceptible change in the attitude of the business and industrialist community 
in Pakistan towards trade with India. The open trade with India is no longer 
regarded as a threat to Pakistan's economy. The unresolved dispute over 
Kashmir is a serious obstacle in the way of full normalization between 
Pakistan and India but trade can work as an effective confidence building 
measure between the two countries. 
156. KHAN (Tanvir Ahmad). Pakistan's regional policy with special 
reference to India and Afghanistan. Pakistan Horizon. 43(4); October, 
1990; 9-28 p. 
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The Pakistan's foreign policies face a number of constraints including its 
geopolitical situation, its geographical configuration, the attitudes of 
neighbouring countries and the scope of its economic and military power. The 
recent transformation of the international system merits a rethinking of 
Pakistan's foreign policy particularly with respect to Afghanistan, its major 
focus for the past decades and India, its major obstacle. While these two areas 
will continue to occupy an important place, Pakistan must expand its agenda to 
pursue a stronger, more forward-looking foreign policy which takes into 
account international changes. 
157. MALIK (Iftikhar H). Indo-Pakistani relations: a historical 
reappraisal. Lost case or turning-point. Contemporary South Asia. 
1(1); January, 1992; 127-142 p. 
The world is marching toward regional cooperation and demilitarization. 
South Asia still remains one of the most volatile regions in the world. The 
historical rivalries between India and Pakistan over unresolved issues like 
Kashmir, added to mutual misperceptions have unleased forces of mistrust and 
confrontation. Taking stock of various issues like nuclear factor or support for 
ethnic movements, the three major under currents in Indo-Pakistani societies, 
argue as the immediatist, who want to resole the issue right away. Gradualists, 
who would like to go slow and steady in efforts for confidence-building and 
antagonists, to whom Indo-Pakistani relations will never be mended. Each 
section carries var>ing degrees of dependence upon the nature of bilateral 
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relations at a particular juncture. The author exhorts ruling elites to rise to the 
occasion to resolve unsettled issues in the larger interests of the South Asian 
populace. 
158. MALIK (Mohan J). Dynamics of Pak hostility: on Indian response. 
Hindustan Times. 75(260); September, 1999; pl3. 
The aftermath of the Kargil war observes have offered several views on the 
reasons behind Pakistan's continuing hostility towards India despite New 
Delhi's efforts to improve relations with it. As a result of Islam's eastward 
march over the least 1000 years, ancient India has already been successfully 
broken up into three states Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. It nuclear weapons 
are used, India may survive but Pakistan will surely disappear from the world 
map. Therefore, Islamabad strategy is to keep strategically important areas of 
Kashmir to meet the Pakistani threat, India needs to pursue several policy 
options simultaneously. One is to engage Islamabad in an arms race by 
doubling India's defence expenditure from 2.3 to 4 percent of GDP which in 
turn will force Pakistan either to spend nearly 70 percent of its budget on 
defence or reach an accommodation with India. Last but not least, India should 
turn the lables on Pakistan by seeking a Kargil war compensation of dollars 60 
billion. It is time to establish a new norm in international relations whereby the 
aggressor is taken to the international court of justice by the victim of 
aggression. 
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159. MATEENUDDIN (Kamal). Pakistan -India relations: a historical 
perspective. Regional Studies. 12(1); winter, 1993-94; 3-68 p. 
The partition of India was not willingly conceded by the Indian leadership. 
The massacre that preceded it has left deep scars in the psyche of the two 
communities. The relations between them were future embittered when New 
Delhi illegally integrated Kashmir into the Indian union. The ignominious role 
of India in the breakup of Pakistan increased bitterness against it. The current 
rise of Hindu military, the nuclear issue and Indian allegation of Pakistani 
involvement in the secessionist movement in East Punjab and the insurgency 
in Kashmir have raised the temperature to boiling point. There is a need to 
reverse the process, but this cannot be achieved till a solution of the Kashmir 
dispute acceptable to all parties is found. 
160. MISRA (K.P). Regional peace and security: coalescence and clash in 
Indo-Pakistan relations. India Quarterly. 40(3-4); July-December, 
1984; 262-273p. 
India and Pakistan have been involved in serious differences leading 
sometimes to open war face. The divergences are of a fundamental and 
multiple nature and they have outstripped convergences. The situation is 
complicated by the conflict of the superpowers. India and Pakistan must learn 
that no external power can bail out third world countries from their economic 
and security problems. 
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161. MUMTAZ (Asraf). View from Lahore: Pakistan should take lead in 
reassuring India. Mainstream. 38(9); February, 2000; p5. 
This article discusses the prospects for talks between India and Pakistan to 
improve their relations at a low ebb. There is an urgent need to start talk about 
talks. They believe that the Government of Pakistan first started the Kargil 
war. It had been realized by them that India had not really gained victory in the 
Kargil war, it is only now that India has started conceding that Mr. Sharif was 
also equally involved in starting what they called Kargil war. The reaction of 
the people of Pakistan and India approving the Lahore declaration was 
extremely favorable indeed the meeting at Lahore could not have taken place 
unless the prime minister were confident that their move would be welcomed 
in their respective countries. 
162. PERKOVICH (George). India, Pakistan and United States. World 
Policv Journal. 13(2); summer, 1996; 49-55 p. 
This article deals with the conflict between India Pakistan on Kashmir issue. 
For the international community the Kashmir issue elicites concern not only 
because Indian and Pakistani forces routinely exchange military fire, violence 
risks to provoke a wider regional struggle that could compel both nuclear arms 
bearing countries into dangerous military escalation. The US, offer to act as a 
mediator, the passage of the Brown Amendment in October 1995 and the 
efforts to induce India into signing the comprehensive test ban treaty have 
prompted India to accuse the US of favoring Pakistan for historic and 
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geopolitical reasons. But although India may not view the US stance favorably 
as the South Asia's greatest power it must take the lead in offering proposals 
that could become the basis for discussion with Pakistan and a positive step 
toward ending decades Indo-Pakistani hostilities. 
163. PURI (Balraj). Kargil in the perspective of Indo-Pak conflicts. 
Mainstream. 37(32); July, 1999; 11-13 p. 
This article discusses that Pakistani factor is common behind the wars of 1947-
48, 1985 and 1971 as also in what is called the current proxy war in the 
Kashmir valley and the 'Avar Like" situation in Kargil. But the effectiveness of 
this factor and its precise nature have varied, in 1972, Pakistan simply 
collapsed as one entity. It was certainly the time for India to settle all 
outstanding issue with Pakistan one and for all. However-fortunately Indira 
Gandhi accepted my plea and role entering into an accord with Sheikh 
Abdullah which restored India's moral legitimacy over the J&K state. As long 
as the administration, the Kashmir issue was dead internationally. 
Internationally too, no communal or secessionist voice was audible. As the 
response of the Kashmir youth started declining, they were replaced by non-
Kashmir youth who fiirther isolated the movement from the people. 
164. RAJ (J). Indo-Pakistan relations since the 1971 war: ^n Indian 
viewpoint. Australian Journal of Political Historv. 20(1); April, 1974; 
22-31 p. 
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The Indo-Pakistan subcontinent has been plagued by four conflicts in its first 
25 years of freedom. There have been two wars in Kashmir, a hmited action in 
Kutch and the latest one over the political crisis in East Pakistan. The futility 
of continuous confrontation was realized both in India and in Pakistan soon 
after the 1971 war. Even after the Simla agreement in 1972 and Delhi 
agreement in 1973, the basic issue still predominates. What is required in the 
region is the changing of hearts on the part of the public and the politicians in 
both the countries and only this can bring to an end the era of confrontation. 
165. RAJ AN (M.S). Indo-Pak relation: democracy versus Pseudo-
democracy. Mainstream. July, 1999; 11-12 p. 
Pakistan seeks parity of status with India, in respect of the other states, attitude 
and policy towards India/Pakistan completely ignoring the geopolitical fact of 
India being much the ability to fiinction independently of many third world 
states including Pakistan. India's role in world affairs focussed only to a 
limited extent on Pakistan, while that of the later is almost entirely concerned 
with India. In many respects this gives Pakistan an "advantage" of sorts-
greater flexibility and movement in manipulating actions, unlike those which 
India is not easily capable off, India's universalist perspective, in fact limits 
India's freedom of policy and action in relation to the small segment of 
relation with Pakistan. 
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166. SARIN (Ritu). Siachen fiasco: India reject Pakistan's claim that 
the glacier dispute has been resolved. Sunday. 166(31); July, 1989; 
5-14 p. 
India and Pakistan have fought to gain control of the disputed Siachen glacier. 
Pakistan's arbitrary claim would normally have elicited a strong protest from 
the Indian foreign office in New Delhi. But in keeping with the spirit of 
understanding that has marked Indo-Pak relations. India and Pakistan are 
making honest efforts to solve the Siachen problem because the states for both 
the countries in the territory' are ver>' high. But it will take several years before 
the issue is sorted out. India and Pakistan blame each other for violating the 
terms of the 1972 treaty. 
167. SHAKOOR (Farzana). Pakistan - India relations after the end of the 
Cold war. Pakistan Horizon. 45 (4); October, 1992; 49-59 p. 
The Pakistan - India rivalry a legacy of the cold war years continues in the 
post cold war era, clearly manifesting itself in disputes like Kashmir and 
Siachen. Despite the US disengagement from south West Asia , Pakistan -
India relations touched their lowest ebb in the recent pasts. The emergence of 
India as a formidable military power and the alleged acquisition of nuclear 
capability by domestic compulsion of weak government in both Islamabad and 
New Delhi in making the two countries indulges in war-like situations. The 
US closeness with India and its distancing from Pakistan in the post cold war 
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world has made the process of normalisation between India and Pakistan more 
difficult. 
168. SIDDIQI (Toufiq A). India - Pakistan cooperation on energy and 
environment : to enhance security. Asian Survey. 35 (3); March, 
1995; 280-290 p. 
This article deals with the India - Pakistan's cooperation on energy and 
environment. The India and Pakistan interpret their security in purely military 
terms, neither will be able to reduce unilaterally its military establishment. In 
both countries, a great deal of privatisation of state enterprise and deregulation 
of the economy has taken place. Measures need to be taken to ensure that 
development is sustainable and does not create severe environmental 
problems. Some possible avenues of cooperation include an integrated natural 
gas supply, joint programs for renewable energy technology, and joint efforts 
to find a suitable toxic waste site close to the Indo - Pakistani border. 
169. SINHA (PB). India - Pakistan : dialogue for peace. Mainstream. 
21(38); May, 1983; p 28. 
This article discusses the tendency to blame others when the fauU is mostly in 
ourselves. It also provides description about religious, cultural and 
international politics. It describes about the "threat perceptions of Pakistan and 
India". The other stresses on the dialogue for enduring peace should start with 
establishing mutual credibility. It is time to take little about how to avert war 
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between India and Pakistan, and more on how to promote peace and 
cooperation between them. 
170. SUBRAMANIAN (R.R.). India - Pakistan : the nuclear option. 
Foreign Affairs Reports. 34 (5); May, 1985; 59-68 p. 
In the mid 1980's, the strategic environment of south Asia displays a markedly 
different character from the prevailing in the seventies. At that time, largely as 
a result of the Bangladesh war, India's credentials as the dominent power in 
the region had been clearly established. The presence of thousands of Soviet 
Military troops in Afghanistan as well as the upgrading of American naval 
facilities on the island of Diego garcia in the Indian ocean raises the proximity 
of the South Asian region to South West Asia may cause the tensions there to 
have their spill over into the former. Added to this is the nuclear factor, one 
that has assumed some degree of importance, in view of the recent success that 
Pakistan has achieved in developing a nuclear weapons capability. 
171. SYED (A.H.). Indo - Pakistan relations: a general survey. Pakistan 
Horizon. 24 (2); January, 1971; 13-17 p. 
The real problem between India and Pakistan has always continued to be 
mistrusted. In this atmosphere, the solution of outstanding disputes between 
the two countries becomes impossible. The present tendency prevalent in 
India, illustrated by her machination in east Pakistan, is to foster internal 
discussions in Pakistan and thus to destroy her. 
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172. VINOD (M.J). Kashmir and India - Pakistan relations: problems and 
prospects. Strategic Analysis. 18 (8); November, 1995; 1141-1155 p. 
This article deals with the Indo - Pak relation. There is little analytical 
agreement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Islamabad contends that 
Kashmir do not want to join India and New Delhi argues that Kashmir is a still 
willing to discuss the problem with Pakistan at a bilateral level. The violent 
climate over this contentious issue an option mentioned in the Indian "non 
paper" in the round of foreign security takes held in January 1994. India 
advances in it the possibility of transforming the line of control (LOC) into a 
line of peace and tranquillity. This can be done by mutual reduction of trops 
on either side until they reach a level compatible with the level that normally 
exists between friendly status. This idea could further be extended to make the 
LOC the international border between the two status, thus leaving the status 
quo intact. 
173. VOHRA (A.M). Confidence building between India and Pakistan. 
South Asia Journal. 5 (3); January, 1992; 313-321 p. 
This article discusses the lake of political equilibrium in both India and 
Pakistan, which worked against the resolution of problems between them. A 
stable political environment should sense the magnitude of the perceived 
external threat. Tension have adversely affected trade between the two states. 
The national interest could be safeguarded and initial hesitation overcome if 
the concept of balanced trade was implemented. Each country should inform 
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the other of plans for changes in weapon system. Diplomacy could also be 
affected in influencing policy if the issue discussed and views exchanged are 
widely publicized in both English and vernacular news paper in both countries. 
174. VOHRA (A.M). India and Pakistan towards better understanding. 
South Asian Survey. 5(1); January-June, 1998; 65-75 p. 
The hopes were raised in May 1997 by the meeting of the Prime Ministers of 
India and Pakistan at Male for improvement of relations through bilateral 
discussion followed by an agreement on a substantive agenda including 
Kashmir, at meeting of foreign secretaries at Delhi in September 1997. The 
Shimla Agreement of 1973 provides for bilateral discussions on the Kashmir 
issue, but the views of the two countries are irreconcilable. Pakistan maintains 
that it is not complete without Kashmir and demands a plebiscite , India insist 
that accession is complete and that it can not accept another partition on 
communal basis. The fundamental question is whether it is in the interest of 
India and Pakistan to normalize relations for the betterment of the people of 
the two countries. The wars and insurgency have not resolved the issue and 
international intervention is not going to either. Tension need to be reduced by 
observing strictly the ceasefire across the line of control to establish peace and 
tranquility. This will create the right environment to discuss all issues. 
175. WALKER (William). International nuclear relation after the Indian 
and Pakistani test explosion. International Affairs. 74 (1-4). July, 
1998; 505-528 p. 
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India's and Pakistan's nuclear test have dismayed the international 
community. However, they can be seen as a culmination of the deteriorated of 
international nuclear relations that has taken place since the mid 1990's. it 
examines the reasons for this deterioration which finds in US - Russian 
relations, the middle east and south Asia, in disputes over arms control 
objectives, and in normative and procedural dilemmas that emerged as the 
number of countries with nuclear weapon programmes was reduced to a 
hardcore of eight states. If key states act positively and cooperatively, the 
climate and processes of nuclear arms control could be transformated. 
176. WALKER (William). International relation after the Indian and 
Pakistan test explosions. International Affairs. 74 (3); July, 1998; 
505-528 p. 
This article deals with the international nuclear relation between India's and 
Pakistan's nuclear tests that have dismayed the international community. 
However, they can be seen as a culmination of the deterioration of 
international nuclear relations that has taken place since the mid 1990's. The 
author examines the reasons for this deterioration which he finds in US -
Russian relations, the middle east and south Asia, in disputes over arms 
control objectives, and in normative and procedural dilemmas. Despite the 
dangers, the author stresses the opportunities that could lie ahead of key status 
act positively and cooperativ eh. the climate and processes of nuclear arm 
control could be transformed. 
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177. ZINKIN (Taya), The background to Indo - Pakistani relations. 
International Relations. 9(1); May, 1981; 31-38 p. 
Indo - Pakistan relations deteriorated by the 1947 partition, mass migrations, 
the Kashmir question. Hindu persecution in Pakistan 1950-1971 and two wars 
1965-1971 further complicated by the Islamic fundamentalism which created 
Pakistan. Largely Muslim, Kashmir must, according to Pakistan, be theirs. 
Moreover, Pakistan's paranoia towards India comes from the origins of Israel 
versus the Arabs. However, secular India has no territorial ambitions and does 
not invade the present Pakistan in 1971 when ten million Hindus fled to India 
from Bangladesh, but resents Pakistan's hostility and its suspected support of 
Sikh terrorism of the Islamic fundamentalism were trade, India and Pakistan 
might live together in peace like France and Germany, they have much in 
common, especially in the Punjab. 
, , SRI LANKA 
178. AHMAD (Imtiaz). 'Regional hegemony in South Asia. India and 
Lanka Tamils' war of Libralisation. Regional Studies. 10(4); Autumn, 
1992; 23-50 p. 
This article discusses the two inter-related agreements in understanding India's 
role in the Sri Lanka Tamils war of liberation. The success of the Indian ruling 
class in organising hegemony, not only with respect to the internal dimension 
but also with respect to the external dimension of the state, and the hegemonic 
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construction of a great and strong Indian image of the modem Western State. 
In this context, the Indian government while organising hegemony among both 
the Indian and Sri Lanka Tamil population, succeeded in transforming the 
Tamil Liberation struggle into an Indo-Sri Lanka affair and in the process 
consolidated India's preeminent position in South Asia. The lates only 
signified India's drive towards great power status in the image of the modem 
western states. 
179. BABU (Ramesh B) Indian intervention in Sri Lanka [1987]: 
Anatomy of a failure. World Affairs. 2 (3); July - September, 1998: 
132-145 p. 
This article states that the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 
1987 was a mistake - an ill considered foreign military 
intervention in a complex and long festering multi-ethnic conflict. 
Premadasa 's "agitation" to leave the country, though humiliating 
was only to be expected. The Indian peace keeping force's 
military operation was doomed from the start because it was based 
on an exaggerate notion of India 's capabilities and leverage vis-a-
vis the LTTE and other Tamil ethnic group. 
180. BULLION (Alan). The Indian Peace Keeping in Sri Lanka. 
Intemational Peace Keeping. 1(2); Summer, 1994; 148-159 p. 
The diployment of the Indian peace-keeping force in Sri Lanka, between 1987 
and 1990 is examined here in relation to the long-established principles that 
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peace-keeping is conducted impartially with minimum force, and on a 
multilateral basis frequently under the authoring of the UN. Although it has 
been argued that the Indian Peace Keeping Force intervened in Sri Lanka by 
consent, as consequence of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of July 1987, the 
political and strategic background of the tam crisis indicates that the 
intervention reflected India's policies as the regional hegemony from the 
traditional parameters of peace-keeping in term of the IPKF's lack of 
impartially and the level of force which was used. 
181. GARMENT (David). Internal dimensions of crisis behaviour: a case 
study of the Indo-Sri Lanka crisis, 1983-1990. Etudes Internationals. 
23(2); June, 1992; 253-277 p. 
Sri Lanka signed on accord with the Indian Government which had, at Sri 
Lanka's request, intervened in Sri Lanka's military and political conflict. 
Indian involvement in Sri Lanka's leaders from a policy of resolving the 
conflict by military means to one of seeking political accommodation with the 
Tamil separatists. However, the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force 
and previous attempts by the Indian Government to air drop supplies to Tamil 
rebels signaled the beginning of international crisis between India and Sri 
Lanka. This paper traces the events and decisional flow of Sri Lanka's elites 
from the pre-crisis period of 1985 to crisis abatement in 1990 in an attempt to 
understand the event and patterns of behavior that led to an international crisis 
between Sri Lanka and India and more generally to elucidate the relationship 
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between domestic ethnic conflict and international crisis. This paper argues 
that Sri Lanka entered into an international crisis precisely because of internal 
threats to its political integrity endangered by its domestic ethnic conflict. 
182. DEVOTTA (Nell). Sri Lanka's Structural Adjustment Program and 
Impact to Indo-Lankan Relations. Asian Survey. 35(5); May, 1998; 
457- 473 p. 
This article deals with the Sri Lanka's western foreign policy during the 
1977-1987 period which led to checkered relations with India, as the later 
viewed this pro western foreign policy as a threat to India regional hegemony. 
India retaliated by supporting the Sri Lanka Tamil rebels bent on creating a 
Tamil State, there by destabilizing the Island's political climate. A 
retrospective evaluation suggests that it was the structural adjustment policies, 
adopted by the post-1977 Sri Lanka regime that influenced a redirection in the 
country's foreign policy which in turn challenged India's regional hegemony 
and soured relations between the two countries. 
183. DHAR (M.K). India's Limited Options. Nation and the World. 
9(208); June. 2000; 14-16 p. 
The Sri Lankan government pressed the panic button after losing the strategic 
elephant pass to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and called for 
international help. Colombo is trying to take comfort from the fact that the 
LTTE had controlled Jaffna till 1995, and its fall once again would not break 
its resolve to bring the rebels to heel. New Delhi's earlier experience of having 
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to withdraw the Indian Peace Keeping Force from Sri Lanka under tragic 
circumstances is too recent to be forgotten. The IPKF had gone to Sri Lanka at 
the invitation of its government to bring the LITE to the negotiating table and 
also to protect the Tamilians from Sinhala onslaught. India ftilly supports the 
ethnic unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and is against a separate 
Tamil State. The LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi and has been banned by the 
Indian government. Internationalising the issue will not help, but only 
complicate matters for Sri Lanka. 
184. GHOSH (Bipattaran). India and the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. India 
Quarterly, 51(1); January-March, 1995; 53-64 p. 
The article deals with the ethnic problem arising out of the Tamils demand for 
a separate state and opposition by the sinhalas became aggravated by India's 
involvement. Initially, India, but geopolitical and domestic compulsions did 
not allow her to remain indifferent. Colombo had to admit New Delhi's stake 
and its inescapable role in the solution of the problem. Consequently, an Indo-
Sri Lanka accord was concluded in 1987 transforming India's role from a 
mediatory into a participatory one. India sent a Peace Keeping Force to ensure 
the implementation of the accord. 
185. HARILAL (K.N) and JOSEPH (K.J). India - Sri Lanka free trade 
accord. Economic and Political Weekly. 34(13); March-April, 1999; 
750-753 p. 
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The preferential trade arrangements under the India-Sri Lanka free trade 
agreement, have varying impact on sectors as well as regions in the two 
countries. The preparatory studies and careful planning are necessary in order 
to provide safeguards and to minimise adjustment costs. South Asian 
Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) countries also came up with 
a proposal for establishing a preferential trading block in the region, but right 
from the beginning, it was clear that SAFTA would remain a statement of 
intention that reality for long. The political conflicts that distance the countries 
of South Asia are too complex to be resolved in the framework of SAARC in 
the near future. Sri Lanka's trade with India accounted for only 5.7 per cent of 
its total trade in 1996, the share of its trade deficit with India in the overall 
trade deficit was as high as 55 per cent. The policy reforms resulted in some 
major changes in the structure of exports. In 1977 structure of Sri Lanka 
exports exhibited all the characteristics of a typical underdeveloped economy, 
with the traditional primary commodities accounting for more than 75 per cent 
of total exports. 
186. IQBAL (Mohammad). India - Lanka relations: an assessment. 
Regional Studies. 11(4); Autumn, 1993; 47-105 p. 
The age-old cultural similarities bridging the twenty kilometer gap of the Pak 
straits between Sri Lanka and India have failed to produce harmony, 
understanding and mutual benefit, instead of the much desired cooperation for 
development. The tense political relation are reflected in the limited economic 
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exchanges between the two neighbours. The 1988's witnessed an extreme 
worsening of mutual relations. Since early 1989. Sri Lanka have been 
attempting to conclude a reciprocally balanced treaty of friendship w ith India 
which could replace the unequal 1987 accord. The procrastination practiced by 
India in finalising the draft and its insistence on the inclusion of all provisions 
which offend Sri Lanka sovereignty complicate efforts at achieving peace. 
187. JAYAWARDANE (Amal). Soviet towards the Indo-Sri Lanka 
problem. Pacific Affairs. 64(2); Summer, 1991; 194-207 p. 
This article state that the Soviet and Indian views on the Sri Lankan situation 
in the 1980s were strongly similar. It was basically the mutuality of their threat 
perceptions regarding the external power involvement in the region. Both 
Moscow and New Delhi became suspicious of the pro-western till Sri Lankan 
foreign policy in the eighties, which was interpreted as having a destabilizing 
effect on the security of the region. Soviet analysts were, however, hardly 
innovative in their reporting on the Indo-Sri Lanka problem. Instead of 
reaching their conclusions through independent analysis, they uncritically 
adopted the Indian rhetoric on Sri Lanka. As a result, they never offered a 
critical evaluation of India's role in the Sri Lanka crisis. 
188. JETLY (Nancy). India and Sri Lanka. Worid Focus. 15(11-12); 
November-December, 1994; 31-33 p. 
The Indo-Sri Lankan relation are clearly on the mend, as they emerges slowly 
but steadily from the trough of bitterness into which they had sunk for the past 
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two decades. The overt hostility at the popular level against India's over 
bearing presence is fast receding, even as there is greater evidence of mutual 
good will trust between two countries. The political leaders of the two 
countries are visibly positive today, as they seek to rise above past 
misperceptions and rancour. The Indian Prime Minister made a special gesture 
in sending his personal emissary to Sri Lanka on the occasion of the swearing 
in of the new Prime Minister, in August 1994. President Kumaratunga's desire 
to visit India as the first foreign country on her itinary has been received 
positively in Indian circles. Indo-Sri Lanka trade has grown in dramatic 
proportions in the last few years, from a meagre turnover of 65 million dollars 
in 1989. it has already grown to 365 million dollars in 1993. It is slated to 
touch a high of 400 million dollars in 1994. The joint commission at the 
ministerial level in operation since 1991 can play an active role in future 
strengthening ties in trade, finance and investment. 
189. KHAN (Ahsan Ali). Tamil question in historical perspective : its 
impact on Indo-Sri Lanka relations. Pakistan Horizon. 37(2); June. 
1984; 47-71 p. 
« 
The article discusses on one hand efforts which were on for a peaceful solution 
of the Tamil problem and. on the other hand, Tamil extremists preparation to 
wage guerrilla warfare for a separate homeland of Tamil in Sri Lanka. The 
problem of the root of animus between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil 
minority is multi-dimensional, as it stems from ethnic, religious, linguistic 
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differences, conflict of economic interest and the histor> of wars between the 
two peoples. The article briefly deals with all these dimensions. It explains 
how the Sri Lanka government has been unable accept even legitimate Tamil 
demands because of unfavourable Sinhalese reactions. It brings out the 
congress government of the Indian Union trying to peacefully settle the Tamil 
question, but reluctant to prevent the Tamil extremists from using its territory 
as spring broad sanctuary for fear of alienating it own 50 million Tamils. It 
deals at length Indian monroe doctrine for Sri Lanka. In this context it brought 
out the US interest in Sri Lanka due to its strategic location in Indian ocean. 
The Sri Lanka government has given hints that, if pressed too hard, it may 
enter into some sort of defence arrangements with the US. 
190. KODIKARA (Shelton U). Genesis of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement 
of 29 July, 1987. Contemporary South Asia. 4(2); July, 1995; 
171-185 p. 
Sri Lanka has periodically feared military intervention on the part of India 
since the formation of the republic in 1972. In the 1980s, President J.R. 
Jayawarden's pro-western liberal economic foreign policy orientation and the 
escalation of the Island's Tamil Sinhalese ethnic crisis gave India's Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi cause for concern. The Indian government saw US 
naval and oil business interests in the Sri Lanka port facilities of Trincomalee 
and the influx of Tamil refugees into Tamil Nadu as potentially destabilizing. 
After unsuccessful negotiations in 1986, Jayawardene committed himself. 
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despite non-consultation of parliament and disapproval from Tamil separatists, 
to signing the July 1987 accords with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The 
cessation of hostilities lasted only until October, when the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam resumed violence against rival Tamil group as well as attacking 
the India Peace Keeping Force. However, Jayaweirdene's stance remained 
unchanged, for the agreement had enabled him to transfer needed troops from 
north to south in order to quell the Sinhalese-Tamil insurgency, thus saving Sri 
Lanka's leadership from possible disasters on more then on front. 
191. KODIKARA (Shelton U). The continuing crisis in Sri Lanka: The 
JVP, the Indian Troops and Tamil Politics. Asian Survev. 29(7); 
July, 1989; 716-724 p. 
Sri Lanka is currently engulfed in a three fold crisis. One of its aspects 
concerns devolution of powers to the Tamils of Sri Lanka. A second 
dimension of the crisis concems Indian Troops withdrawal and has been 
brought out by the President Premdasa's sudden request that all Indian Forces 
in Sri Lanka be withdrawn by 29 July 1989. A third dimension is the anti 
Indian and anti-government campaign carried out by the National Liberation 
Front. The three dimensions of this crisis are interrelated and interact with 
each others. 
192. PARASHER (S.C). Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Foreign Affairs 
Reports. 36(7-10); July-October, 1987; 109-161 p. 
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The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of 1987 offers the framework for peace in Sri 
Lanka. It has been generally welcomed by all nations including the two super 
powers. The agreement is representative of the common philosophy which 
India and Sri Lanka have shared, a philosophy which treats life as sacred and 
believes in live and let live. It recognizes a multi - ethnic and a multi - lingual 
plural society consisting of Sinhalese, the agreement embodies liberalism as 
well as humanism. 
193, PHANDIS (Urmila). India and Sri Lanka. International Studies. 
17(3-4); July-December, 1978; 581-592 p. 
India and Sri Lanka's policy should necessarily comprise aid policies to 
stimulate trade not only with India but also in the Asian region. It should 
provide for economic linkage between the two countries that would make for 
the maximum utilization of resources endowment in the two countries. There 
is, need for a commodity approach based on cost benefit criteria for 
investment. This would call for a corresponding change in the approach of 
self-sufficiency and at the same time test the ability of the government to 
manage pressures from interest groups in the commodity sector. 
194. RAO (Venkateshwar). Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka: India's role and 
perception. Asian Survey. 28(4); April, 1988; 419-436 p. 
In the post - Indira Gandhi era, a perceptible change came over the Indian 
government's Sri Lanka policy. The new government made an effort to gain 
the Sri Lanka government's trust by restraining militant Tamil activity in 
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India. A major weakness of the Indian Diplomacy was its lack of enough 
leverage with rival parties in the ethnic conflict. Ultimately Indian's mediation 
succeeded neither in bringing down the ethnic tensions. When mediations 
failed India was left with only the option of direct involvement. 
195. SARVANANTHAN (Muttu Krishna). Indo - Sri Lanka free trade 
type and reality. Economic and Political Weekly. 35(14); April, 2000; 
1157-1160 p. 
India and Sri Lanka have concluded three major treaties since independence. 
They are the Srima - Shastri Pact (1964), the Indo - Sri Lanka peace accord 
(1987), and Indo - Sri Lanka free trade agreement (1998). The Indo - Sri 
Lanka free trade agreement was signed on December 28, 1998 and was 
supposed to have come into effect on March 1, 1999. Free trade is understood 
to be export and import of goods and services unhindered by tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade. During 1976-94 Sri Lanka exported 487 items to India 
but the bulk of it were traded irregularly and in very small values. Sri Lanka 
exported only a dozen major items to India regularly and in substantial values. 
Mostly primary products and raw materials. At the outset about three major 
treaties between India and Sri Lanka in the past four decades were mentioned. 
It is high time India and Sri Lanka to undertake a genuine soul searching of 
their policy making process. 
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196. SHARMA ( Mohanlal). Globalization and Industrial Development in 
South Asia - A case of Pharmaceutical Industry in India and Sri 
Lanka. South Asian Studies. 31(1-2); January - December, 1996; 
77-79 p. 
This article deals with the industrial developments of India and Sri Lanka. The 
policy draft attracted much discussion in concerned circles for more than one 
year. The Union Parliament took it up for discussion only in August 1993. 
Most of the discussion was focused on price regulation provisions which were 
found having no theet. The government of India drawing a lesson, split the 
policy into two parts. Licensing and pricing. The first one with an accent on 
substantial delicensing was announced immediately while the later took some 
time. The final version carries not much difference from the original draft. In 
all number of price controlled drugs was reduced to 83 fi-om 146 in 1987 and 
376 in 1979. Though, it is too early to say, initial reports speak of fiiture elitist 
trend in production and study price rise in India and Sri Lanka. 
197. SURYANARAYAN (V). India and the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka : 
a case study of third party mediation to resolve domestic conflicts. 
Strategic Analvsis. 18(3); June, 1993; 387-405 p. 
The communal holocaust in Sri Lanka of 1983, the subsequent anti - Tamil 
program and exodus of Tamil reftigees to India and the creation of the sixth 
amendment to the Sri Lanka constitution excluding the Tamil opposition from 
parliament marked the beginning of an ethnic that could not be ignored by 
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India. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wished to insulate Sri Lanka from adverse 
external forces which would have a destabilizing impact on India's security 
and strategic environment and calm secessionist demand in Tami Nadu. The 
demise of Indira Gandhi had its adverse fallout on India - Sri Lanka relations. 
The India -Sri Lanka accord of 29 July 1987 marked a turning point in Sri 
Lanka's ethnic conflict. Indian Peace Keeping Force, which was to protect the 
Tamils against the onslaughts of the Sri Lanka Army, Eelam andended up 
fighting an unseen enemy in the midst of an unsympathetic population. The 
failure and ignominious role that external armed forces can play in resolving 
the domestic conflict of other countries. 
198. UDAYASHANKAR (B). Indo - Sri Lanka accord on Tamils of 
Indian origin. Strategic Analysis. 9(12); March, 1986; 1240-1252 p. 
India and Sri Lanka announce on 15 January 1986 that an understanding has 
been reached on the question of the residual stateless persons of Indian origin 
in Sri Lanka. Not deeming them citizens was an injustice, taking into 
consideration the fact that they have been there for generations. Under the 
provision of the new act, a plantation Tamil of Indian origin granted the 
country's citizenship will have the same right as those registered under any 
other law. Those granted citizenship will also be registered, a certificate of 
citizenship issued and their names gazetted. 
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, THAILAND 
199. JHA (Ganganath). Indo - Thailand relations: problems and 
prospects. International Studies. 16(3); July - September, 1977; 
331-342 p. 
This article seeks to trace the roots of Indo - Thai relations and examine why 
Indo - Thai relations could not flourish in the post - independence era. It 
anticipates on account of the cold war and the Indian policy of non -
alignment that Thailand could not come very close to India, or due to personal 
differences in the outlook of India's first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lai Nehru, 
and his counterpart in Thailand, field marshal Phibun Songgram. It also 
analyses the fact that Thai - Pakistani ties obstructed bilateral relations with 
India. 
200. MAISRIKROD (Surin). Thailand's policy dilemmas towards 
Indo - China. Contemporary South East Asia. 14 (3); December, 
1992; 287-300 p. 
This article attempts to put into perspective significant turns, as well as critical 
issues, in Thailand's foreign policy towards the Indo - Chinese states, 
particularly Vietnam. It argues that Thailand foreign policy towards Indo -
China has always been a reaction to the involvement of major power. First the 
colonial powers, then the US during the Vietnam war and then China during 
the role on mainland South East Asia, Thailand, in the post - cold war period, 
is trying to formulate a more independent policy towards its Eastern 
146 
neighbours only to be faced with an increasingly comphcated international 
environment. With more players and different agendas in Indo - China, 
Bargkok's "traditional" role is likely to be marginalized. 
, , VIETNAM 
201. JHA (Ganganath). India's Vietnam policy in regional perspective. 
Strategic Analysis. 18(10); January, 1996; 1423-1432 p. 
This article discusses the India's policy of pursuing friendship with Vietnam 
right since its inspection. It disliked the containment drive. It opposed the 
formation of SEATO. It was unhappy when Vietnam was isolated during 
1979-1989 and was critical of the policy of "bleeding Vietnam white". The 
ASEAN countries were critical of India for being pro -Vietnam but they post-
cold war era and influenced in it the ASEAN fold. India's traditional 
projection of Vietnam regional role was given credibility and India's Vietnam 
policy was inadvertently recognized by the regional block as legitimate and 
realistic. 
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